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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
With the belief that entrepreneurship is a key driver of economic growth and job 
creation, many U.S. states have launched ambitious programs aimed at stimulating 
entrepreneurial activity within their borders. Not surprisingly, most of these programs target 
the science and technology-related sectors. Despite state government enthusiasm for such 
programs, systematic evidence regarding the effects on these programs on entrepreneurial 
firms remains lacking (Brander, Du, & Hellmann, 2011; Lerner, 2009). Unlike federal 
initiatives, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program (Lerner, 1999; 
Wallsten, 2000), information about state innovation programs is fragmented and thus 
challenging to assemble. Teasing apart the causal impact of these initiatives is further 
complicated by the absence of viable comparison baselines.  
My dissertation provides new evidence on the effects of state innovation programs 
on entrepreneurial science and technology companies in the Great Lakes region. To do so, I 
assemble novel databases and use multiple research methods to address the effects in a series 
of studies. My first essay examines the extent to which, if at all, competitive R&D awards 
from Michigan innovation programs enhance the performance of participating ventures 
relative to startups that seek but fail to receive an award. I then expand the scope of my 
inquiries to other states in the Great Lakes region and investigate the broader implications of 
large-scale programs on entrepreneurial activity, including patterns of entry and survival 




The Great Lakes region1 is a particularly useful context in which to investigate the 
interplay between state policies and entrepreneurial-firm behavior and performance. First, 
the ideas and human capital needed to launch new science and technology companies are 
geographically distributed across this region, which houses numerous top-ranked universities 
and research institutions (Austin & Affolter-Caine, 2006). However, despite the favorable 
innovation environment in the Great Lakes region, the venture capital and support services 
typically required for high-growth startups are tightly agglomerated elsewhere, specifically in 
the coastal states of Massachusetts and California (Chen, Gompers, Kovner, & Lerner, 2010; 
Samila & Sorenson, 2011b). Between 1995 and 2009, for example, 16.1 percent of the 
doctorates in life sciences were awarded by research institutions in the Great Lakes region, 
while 15.9 percent were awarded in California and Massachusetts. In the same period, 
however, startups headquartered in the Great Lakes states received only 3.9 percent of U.S. 
venture capital (VC) investments in the life sciences, while California and Massachusetts-
based ventures received 56.2 percent.2 While arguments exist for and against public efforts 
to boost local entrepreneurial activity, evidence on the effects of these initiatives remains 
scarce (Chatterji, Glaeser, & Kerr, 2013; Lerner, 2009; Samuel, 2010).  
To fill this gap in understanding, my dissertation contributes new evidence on the 
impact of state innovation programs on entrepreneur firms in three related and 
complementary studies. The first study, joint with Rosemarie Ziedonis, uses a unique 
database of R&D award competition applicants and recipients in Michigan from 2002 
through 2008 to study the impact of state awards on firm performance. The data, drawn 
primarily from state government archives, provide pre-treatment characteristics and external 
                                                 
1  The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) defines the Great Lakes region to include Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 




reviewer scores for all award applicants, including firms that sought but did not receive state 
R&D funding. Using regression discontinuity design methods (Lee & Lemieux, 2010), we 
find strong and compelling evidence that state R&D funding enhances the commercial 
viability (i.e., survival) of recipient firms, suggesting that receiving an award eases a firm’s 
financial constraints. In particular, among firms with scores near the discontinuous funding 
threshold, awardees were more likely to survive three years after the competition than 
otherwise comparable applicants that sought but did not receive an award. We also find that 
receipt of state R&D funding enhances the follow-on financing for new ventures, but only 
for those with more onerous information challenges in entrepreneurial capital markets.  
The second study broadens my scope to the impact of state innovation programs in 
other states in the Great Lakes region, including Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Prior 
studies in strategy and economics show that initial founding conditions can affect the post-
entry performance of entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Audretsch, 1995; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 
2010; Mata, Portugal, & Guimarães, 1995). Other studies explore the difficulties firms face in 
their attempts to transition between idea discovery and the launch of successful products, or 
what is termed the “valley of death” (Kerr & Nanda, 2009b). Whether state initiatives can 
improve the entrepreneurial founding environment and help new ventures bridge the valley 
of death in the early stages of their development is a matter of ongoing academic debate 
(Lerner, 2009). To address this question, my study assesses the extent to which state 
innovation programs increase the survival prospects for life sciences startups in the Great 
Lakes region. Based on the post-entry performance of new ventures, my evidence suggests 
that new ventures formed when an innovation program is present have significantly higher 




that program effects on firm survival diminish over time and that they are more pronounced 
for firms in sub-sectors with greater resource requirements for commercialization.  
Finally, in my third essay, I investigate the effects of state innovation programs on 
the location decisions of high technology companies in the life sciences and information 
technology industries. For new science and technology companies, the decision to migrate to 
other regions often involves a difficult set of trade-offs. Prior research suggests that staying 
local allows entrepreneurs to leverage interpersonal networks and existing organizational ties 
(e.g., with universities or other research institutions) while avoiding the disruptions and costs 
of relocation (Dahl & Sorenson, 2012; Feldman, 2004). On the other hand, failure to re-
locate near entrepreneurial sources could make it more difficult to secure expansion capital, 
management talent, or business services, thus limiting the upside potential of these ventures 
(Chen, Gompers, Kovner, & Lerner, 2010; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; Porter & 
Stern, 2001). In this study, I present evidence of the effect of state innovation programs on 
firm relocation decisions by tracking the geographic location changes of life sciences and 
information technology companies initially established in the Great Lakes region. Specifically, 
I find that the startups with greater needs for external financing and support services in the 
commercialization process are more likely to leave their home states.  Importantly, I further 
document that, for relatively young firms, the baseline proclivity of firms to stay local 
increases with the presence of a state innovation program.   
All three essays in my dissertation benefit from 25 semi-structured interviews I 
conducted with entrepreneurs, investors, and government officials in the Great Lakes states. 
These interviews deepened my understanding of the role of state innovation programs and 




the perceived effects of specific programs as well as the viewpoints of entrepreneurs and 
investors not participating in such programs.  
Overall, my dissertation contributes to five main strands of literature. First, it 
contributes to a burgeoning literature in strategic management, finance, and economics on 
the performance implications of alternative sources of entrepreneurial financing. Prior work 
has investigated the various effects of corporate funding (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Katila, 
Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008; Park & Steensma, 2012), venture capital (Fitza, Matusik, & 
Mosakowski, 2009; Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2004), and federal government monetary 
support (Brander et al., 2011; Lerner, 2010) on the success of new ventures. However, the 
extent to which public efforts at the state level can affect entrepreneurial-firm performance 
has received little attention, a gap that my dissertation addresses.  
Second, my research contributes to a growing literature on how institutional and 
policy reforms affect entrepreneurial firms and whether public sector intervention can 
reduce new venture market failures (Eesley, 2010; Kerr & Nanda, 2009b). In doing so, it fills 
a gap in management research and could thus contribute to debates on public policy issues 
related to entrepreneur and economic development (Adler & Jermier, 2005; Kochan, Guillen, 
Hunter, & O'Mahony, 2009).  
Third, my research is salient to the literature on the association between a firm’s 
founding environment and its post-entry performance (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Geroski et al., 2010). Specifically, it provides systematic and cross-state evidence on whether 
changes in the entrepreneurial founding environment created by state initiatives can affect 
new venture post-entry performance, and as a consequence, survival.  
Fourth, my research extends current work on economic geography, industry 




decisions. Although previous studies in international business and industrial agglomeration 
have identified institutional-, industrial- and firm-level factors that may affect firm location 
decisions, most of these studies focus on existing industry clusters and the initial location 
decisions of in-country or global ventures (Alcacer & Chung, 2007; Glaeser & Kerr, 2009; 
Wheeler & Mody, 1992).  
Finally, within strategic management, my dissertation contributes to the ongoing 
search for ways to tease apart the consequences associated with non-random actions using 
observational data, a methodological challenge that continues to garner widespread attention 
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CHAPTER 2  
STATE GOVERNMENTS AS FINANCIERS OF TECHNOLOGY STARTUPS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Faced with an eroding base of traditional manufacturing industries, U.S. state 
governments have assumed a more prominent role as financiers of new science and 
technology companies. In 2002, for example, Ohio launched a $1.6 billion Ohio Third 
Frontier (OTF) initiative to support technology-based economic development within the 
state. The program is credited with helping create and finance over 571 Ohio-based 
companies since its inception (SRI, 2009). Also aimed at stimulating entrepreneurial 
innovation inside its borders, the state of Utah established a Science Technology and 
Research (USTAR) program in 2006. In addition to funding research at Utah-based 
universities, USTAR subsidizes the commercialization activities of technology startups 
within the state (Duran, 2010).  
Despite large-scale policy experimentation, little is known about the effects of state 
innovation programs on the performance of participating ventures. Relative to federal 
                                                 
1 We thank representatives from the Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC) for providing 
access to archives and for answering our many questions, and Matt Justice, Meng Lu, Karina Mann and 
Anastasia Strader for excellent research assistance. Financial support from the Ewing Marion Kauffman 
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We are also grateful to suggestions from Janet Berkovitz, Ha Hoang, 
Jenny Kuan, Francine Lafontaine, Marvin Lieberman, David Mowery, Ramana Nanda, Joanne Oxley, Mike 
Roach, Robert Seamans, Jagadeesh Sivadasan, Heidi Williams, Brian Wu, Arvids Ziedonis and participants in 
seminars and conferences at UC Berkeley, UCLA, Georgia State University, the University of Maryland, the 
University of Michigan, NBER, Northwestern University, the University of Oregon, the University of 
Pennsylvania, and Stanford University.  




initiatives in the United States like the Small Business Investment Research (SBIR) program, 
information about state-level R&D programs is fragmented and cumbersome to assemble. 
Empirical research on this topic is further plagued by methodological problems. Absent 
appropriate baselines for comparison, it is difficult to discern whether state funds causally 
improve firm performance or whether more promising companies are simply chosen for 
awards. Given the pervasiveness of state-level R&D programs (Coburn & Berglund, 1995; 
Feldman & Lanahan, 2010), distinguishing between these interpretations is vital both from 
an academic and practical (managerial/public policy) perspective. 
This study provides new evidence based on innovation programs launched since 
1999 in the state of Michigan. Like many states in the Great Lakes region, Michigan has been 
battered for decades by declining health in its manufacturing sectors and an outmigration of 
high-skilled labor (Samuel, 2010). To diversify its tax base and re-kindle economic growth 
within the state, the Michigan Life Science Corridor (MLSC) program was launched in 1999 
through a $1 billion legal settlement from the tobacco industry. Similar to the later Ohio and 
Utah initiatives, the MLSC and its affiliated programs offer R&D financing to startups 
through a competitive awards process.  
To test whether state R&D awards enhance the performance of participating 
ventures, we compile a novel database from Michigan government archives on all for-profit 
participants in competitions held from 2002 through 2008. Importantly, these data enable us 
to observe both pre-treatment characteristics and external reviewer scores for the entire 
applicant pool, including firms that sought but failed to receive an award. Also useful from a 
methodological perspective, these data reveal discontinuous cut-offs in the distribution of 
reviewer scores that correspond to receipt of funding. This artifact of the selections process 
enables us to use regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods to compile more 




comparable sets of participating and non-participating ventures than is typically possible for 
innovation scholars. Increasingly common in economics (e.g., Black, 1999; Lee & Lemieux,  
2010), RDD-related approaches remain under-utilized in the strategic management and 
entrepreneurial finance literatures.2 
The results of our analyses are quite striking. On one hand, we find strong and 
compelling evidence that program participation bolstered the commercial viability of 
Michigan-based technology companies:  funded firms are 12-13% more likely to survive 2 
years and 21-23% more likely to survive 4 years after the competition. The results hold in 
subsamples of firms proximate to the funding cut-off and do not appear to be driven purely 
by the selection of “better” companies for the awards. This evidence is consistent with the 
view that the program helped ameliorate imperfections in the market for entrepreneurial 
financing: absent R&D awards from the state, companies of comparable quality were less 
likely to remain in business.  
The effects of program participation on other aspects of entrepreneurial-firm 
performance—including patent productivity and receipt of follow-on financing—are more 
ambiguous. Surprisingly, we find no discernable effect of award receipt on patent 
productivity. Our analysis reveals, however, that state R&D funding stimulates follow-on 
financing from other government (SBIR) and VC sources when capital-market imperfections 
are more severe. We interpret this latter evidence as consistent with the view that 
competition-based R&D awards help reduce informational inefficiencies in markets for 
entrepreneurial financing (Hall & Lerner, 2010; Lerner, 1999).  
This study contributes to three main strands of literature. First, it contributes to a 
burgeoning literature in strategic management, finance and economics on the performance 
                                                 
2 See Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2011) for a recent exception in entrepreneurial finance. 




implications of alternative sources of entrepreneurial financing. Prior work has investigated 
the effects on new ventures of financial backing from corporations (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 
2009; Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008; Park & Steensma, 2012), independent 
venture capitalists (Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009; Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2004) 
and national government agencies (Brander et al., 2010; Cox & Katila, 2010; Kortum & 
Lerner, 2000). The extent to which, if at all, R&D financing from state-government sources 
affects new venture performance has received little attention in this literature, a gap that our 
study helps fill.  
Within strategic management, the study also is salient to an ongoing search for ways 
to tease apart the consequences associated with non-random actions using observational data, 
a methodological challenge that continues to garner widespread attention in the field 
(Durand & Vaara, 2009; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998). Our study not only 
underscores the importance of taking into account the underlying selection process, but also 
illustrates how discontinuities that result from that process can be fruitfully exploited. 
Finally, we contribute to a more targeted line of inquiry on R&D program evaluation 
(Jaffe 2002; Klette, Møen, & Griliches, 2000). Even though governments aim to alleviate 
sources of market failure through R&D policy intervention, they often fail to do so due to 
design and implementation problems (Lerner 2009; Wallsten, 2000). Empirical evidence on 
this topic nonetheless remains inconclusive and is sparse in state-government contexts. We 
provide new evidence with an approach that could be used to evaluate the private returns of 
other R&D programs, both within the United States and in other countries.  Although 
providing limited guidance on whether public R&D programs are justified from a social 
welfare perspective (see Klette et al., 2000), such evidence would deepen extant 




understanding on the extent to which government R&D awards boost the performance of 
award recipients above and beyond what otherwise would be predicted. 
2.2 Rationale for Government R&D Awards and Prior Empirical Evidence 
Why should governments subsidize R&D projects in the private sector?3 The answer 
rests on theoretical concerns about market failure. One concern is that, absent policy 
intervention, the private sector will under-invest in R&D relative to socially optimum levels 
(Griliches, 1992; Hall, 1996; Jaffe, 2002). The output of R&D (“knowledge”) has a public 
goods component: use by one firm does not preclude use by another. In the presence of 
knowledge externalities, or “spillovers,” the socially optimal rate of R&D investment can 
exceed the private returns to such investments.  
A second and related concern is that capital markets function imperfectly, further 
eroding R&D incentives in the private sector (Hall and Lerner, 2010). For young science and 
technology companies, the development and commercialization of new products typically 
requires financial backing from third parties. Discerning the value and commercial promise 
of embryonic technologies nonetheless can be difficult for outsiders. As Hall and Lerner 
(2010) point out, when investors find it challenging to sort good projects from bad due to 
imperfect information, financial backing can be more costly or difficult to secure. If financial 
intermediaries like banks, angel investors, and venture capitalists are unable to fully mitigate 
this problem, entrepreneurs may be unable to secure sufficient capital through market 
mechanisms alone (Lerner & Kegler, 2000).  
                                                 
3 In addition to allocating R&D funds directly to companies, governments can reduce the costs of industrial 
R&D through tax-based incentives. Wilson (2009) and Hall and Lerner (2010) discuss alternative policy levers 
used to stimulate innovation in the private sector and key trade-offs among them. 




In addition, state governments pursue more parochial interests: to stimulate 
economic growth inside geographic borders and to diversify the tax base (Acs et al., 2008). 
Not surprisingly, eligibility in state-run R&D and commercialization programs is therefore 
restricted to companies with headquarters or major R&D facilities within the state. A more 
specific concern is that entrepreneurs within the state may find it difficult to secure 
“expansion” capital without re-locating to a major hub of venture capital activity. Despite 
syndicated deals through investor networks, the U.S. venture capital (VC) industry remains 
tightly agglomerated in the bicoastal states of California and Massachusetts (Sorenson and 
Stuart, 2001). From 1995-2009, for example, only 25.8 percent of biomedical research dollars 
from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) flowed to California and Massachusetts-based 
institutions. That same year, however, over 56.2 percent of U.S. venture capital to 
biomedical startups originated from these two states. 4  To facilitate interactions with 
entrepreneurs and to lower monitoring costs, venture capitalists typically require portfolio 
companies to locate key operations and personnel nearby, including top managers and core 
development teams (Chen, Gompers, Kovner, & Lerner, 2010). By providing entrepreneurs 
with an alternative source of R&D financing, state governments may be able to retain more 
promising ventures and, in doing so, stimulate the development of an indigenous investment 
community.  
 Empirical evidence on the “treatment” effects of government R&D funding on 
participating (versus non-participating) remains largely based on national programs. Within 
the United States context, the SBIR program and a similar subsidy-based Advanced 
Technology Project (ATP) initiative have received the lion’s share of analytical attention.5 
                                                 
4 Authors’ calculations based on NIH and VentureXpert data. 
5 Lerner (2009) and Brander, Du, and Hellmann (2011) review the evidence from national programs outside the 
United States. For brevity, we restrict attention below to evidence on U.S.-based programs. 




Even then, prior studies fail to reach consensus on the effects of these long-standing 
programs on participant-firm performance. 
Consider evidence from the SBIR program. Comparing SBIR awardees with 
matched samples of entrepreneurial companies, Lerner (1999) finds that SBIR recipients are 
more successful in securing follow-on VC financing relative to non-recipients. This evidence 
is consistent with the view that winning a public R&D awards can help “certify” the quality 
of new technology companies to outside investors, thus reducing information problems in 
markets for entrepreneurial financing. Feldman and Kelley (2003) report a similar “halo” 
effect in the ATP program. Based on survey evidence, Audretsch, Link and Scott (2002) 
further suggest that SBIR awards enable the commercialization of research that would not 
have been undertaken absent policy intervention.  
Wallsten (2000) and Cox and Katilla (2010) offer a less sanguine view of the 
relationship between SBIR funding and new venture performance. Taking into account the 
SBIR selection process, Wallsten (2000) fails to discern that the awards stimulate 
employment growth among young companies, an effect attributed to the “cherry-picking” of 
more-promising applicants for the awards. More troublesome, Wallsten suggests that the 
SBIR program fails to address capital-market imperfections, crowding out R&D funds from 
private sources on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Also troublesome, Cox and Katila (2010) suggest 
that SBIR funding undermines the innovative and commercial productivity of technology 
ventures, based on comparisons between VC-backed companies that did (versus did not) 
receive such awards. As mentioned earlier, systematic evidence on the performance 
implications of state-government programs remains lacking. 




2.3 Michigan’s Innovation Programs6  
 Overview 2.3.1
To investigate the effects of state-government R&D funding on new-venture 
performance, we focus on three innovation programs introduced since 1999 in Michigan, a 
state that houses top-tier medical and research institutions despite well-known challenges in 
traditional manufacturing industries (Samuel, 2010). The Michigan Life Science Corridor 
was the state’s first large-scale innovation program. When the program was announced in 
1999, its billion-dollar size was unprecedented among state R&D initiatives. The MLSC 
aimed to position Michigan among the top five U.S. states in the life science sector within 
twenty years, in part by stimulating a more vibrant base of entrepreneurial companies. The 
annual budget anticipated for the program was $50 million, much of which was initially 
directed toward university research. 
After gubernatorial turnover and lobbying from non-life-science industries, the 
MLSC was modified in 2004 to include advanced automotive technologies, alternative 
energy and homeland security technologies. Reflecting this shift, the program was renamed 
the Michigan Technology Tri-corridor (MTTC). Soon thereafter, the MLSC and MTTC 
activities were subsumed under a new 21st Century Jobs Fund (21CJF) program. From 2000 
through 2003, the total program budget ranged from $32 to $50 million per year. In the 
ensuing years, annual budgets fluctuated from $10 million in 2004-2005 and $200 million in 
2006-2007, to $75 million in 2008. 
Under this umbrella of programs, Michigan-based companies could apply for R&D 
awards to help defray product development and commercialization expenses in eligible 
                                                 
6 This section draws on conversations with program managers during 2010-2011, annual Battelle/BIO State 
Bioscience Initiatives reports, archived minutes from Michigan Strategic Fund Board meetings, and 
government reports (e.g., MEDC, 2010). 




sectors, with preference given to young and small companies. Relative to other sources of 
government R&D funds for technology ventures, the sums available from the state are non-
trivial. As shown in Figure 2.1 Average Size of MEDC Program Funding to Awardees, the 
mean award per firm was $600,000 in 2002 and exceeded $1.5 million in the 2006 and 2008 
competitions. By comparison, SBIR technology development and commercialization awards 
in this period averaged around $500,000 but included a per-firm limit of $1 million (Wessner, 
2007).7 
Across all incarnations of Michigan’s innovation programs—from the MLSC and 
MTTC to the ongoing 21st Century Jobs Fund—one agency was responsible for overseeing 
and managing the state’s R&D awards to for-profit companies. This quasi-governmental 
agency, the Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC), is responsible for 
economic development in the state. According to MEDC officials, state R&D awards are 
typically structured as repayable debt or “convertible loans” that can switch to equity if 
certain milestones are met.8 Although contract terms are confidential, program managers 
report that loans are offered at competitive rates and typically allow firms to defer payment 
for a two-to-three year period. Program managers saw some advantages of this financial 
instrument over pure loans, which have limited upside potential, and grants, which as 
subsidies offer less means for accountability and are more difficult to “sell” politically.  
In addition to awarding R&D funds to technology startups, the state of Michigan 
plays a more passive role in entrepreneurial capital markets through its “fund-of-funds” 
program. In this initiative, the state invests in venture capital funds that support Michigan-
                                                 
7 Statistics are based “Phase II” SBIR awards administered through the National Science Foundation. As 
Wessner (2007) reports, the Small Business Administration (SBA) increased the per-firm limit of SBIR Phase II 
grants from $750,000 to $1 million in 2003. 
8 Both parties must agree to the conversion. From an entrepreneur’s perspective, the conversion trades off loan 
repayment with the sale of private equity in the company. See Lerner (2009) for more detailed discussion of 
alternative financing vehicles. 




based companies in hopes of increasing the supply of expansion capital within the state. The 
state has sponsored two such funds to date, one in 2006 with $95 million and another in 
2011 with $120 million.9 Unfortunately it is premature to assess the impact of these fund-of-
fund investments, either overall or relative to direct models of R&D financing. We therefore 
restrict attention below to R&D awards directly allocated to technology startups through the 
combined set of MLSC, MTTC and 21CJF programs.  
  The selection process  2.3.2
To receive R&D funding from the state, entrepreneurs must submit an application 
through a competitive awards process. As depicted in Figure 2.2. The Selection Process 
(Decision Tree), proposals are first screened for Request for Proposal (RFP) compliance. All 
proposals that meet the RFP requirements proceed through a competitive evaluation and 
review process. In Round 1, proposals are sent to an external panel of peer reviewers for 
evaluation and scoring.10 The proposals are scored based on four equal-weighted criteria 
specified in the RFP: (1) Scientific Merit, (2) Personnel expertise, (3) Commercialization 
Merit and (4) Ability to Leverage Additional Funds. Based on Round 1 scores, top-ranked 
proposals are invited to proceed to Round 2. Lower-ranked proposals are omitted from 
consideration. 
In Round 2, additional input is gleaned from interviews with representatives from 
applicant companies and proposals are re-scored based on the RFP criteria. Following this 
second evaluation, the external review panel recommends proposals for funding and 
provides the state information about each proposal’s ranking, score, and budget. A 
                                                 
9 For more information, see http://www.venturemichigan.com (last visited Jan 03, 2012). 
10 From 2002 through 2006, technical experts from the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS) evaluated the proposals. In 2008, the review process was altered to include individuals with business 
and/or entrepreneurial investment experience.  




governing board, the Strategic Economic Investment and Commercialization (SEIC) Board, 
then selects the highest-ranked projects recommended for funding until the total budget 
allocated for the competition is expended. According to MEDC officials, the total budget 
amount for a competition round is largely pre-determined prior to a solicitation for 
proposals. Funding decisions are final and not subject to appeal.  
The final stage is “due diligence” and contract negotiation. At this stage, projects can 
be dropped for two main reasons. First, the state may choose to rescind an award if new 
information revealed through due diligence renders an applicant ineligible (e.g., financial 
commitments from third parties have fallen through). Alternatively, the applicant may 
choose to withdraw from consideration due to concerns about the terms or cost of financing 
or unrelated reasons (e.g., a shift in corporate priorities).  
 Of the 297 entrepreneurial-firm proposals in our estimation sample described below, 
roughly half (49%) were screened out in Round 1 of the selection process while the 
remainder (51%) proceeded to Round 2. Of those invited to Round 2, less than half (41%) 
received R&D funds. In total, 21% of all entrepreneurial-firm applicants from 2002 through 
2008 received financial assistance through these state-run R&D programs, and 7% were 
either rescinded or withdrawn.11 
2.4 Data  
 Sample construction 2.4.1
Applicants for R&D financing through Michigan’s competition-based programs were 
identified with archival data from the Michigan Economic Development Corporation. For 
                                                 
11 In contrast, Wessner (2007, p. 55) reports NSF acceptance rates of SBIR proposals between 40 and 60 
percent from 1997 through 2005. For the federal ATP initiative, Feldman and Kelley (2003, p. 155) document 
that “fewer than 20 percent of proposed projects [submitted between 1990 and 1999] actually receive funding” 
1990 and 1999.”  




each proposal, these data report information about the principle investigator (name, title, 
department), organization (name, address), project type (applied research or 
commercialization), industry sector, and funds requested. In addition, these data reveal 
project-specific information generated during the evaluation process, including the firm’s 
aggregate external reviewer score, stage of advancement through the competition, and how 
much funding was recommended and dispersed, if any.  
To identify “entrepreneurial-firm” applicants, we first restricted attention to 
proposals from for-profit companies, thus omitting awards to universities and non-profits. 
Based on a state business registry (described below), we then identified the founding years 
and selected the subset of for-profit applicants that were 15 years or younger as of the 
application year.12 This age filter eliminated 23 older firms from the estimation sample, but 
retained 92 percent of all for-profit applicants. As a robustness check, we re-ran the 
regressions below with the entire company-applicant sample and obtained similar results.  
Finally, thirteen (13) firms filed multiple applications in a given round of competition. 
If a firm with multiple applications received R&D funds in a single round, we omitted 
unfunded proposals of the company from the control-group sample. For non-winners with 
multiple submissions, we retained only the applicant’s top-ranked proposal in the control 
group to yield greater comparability with the awardee sample.  
In combination, these criteria resulted in 297 applications filed by 241 
entrepreneurial firms from 2002 through 2008. 
                                                 
12 Hellmann and Puri (2002) define “startups” as firms less than 11 years old while Stuart et al. (1999) report 
that the maximum age of venture-backed biotechnology firms with IPOs in the 1980s to mid-1990s is 12 years 
since founding. Since our data span the decade of the 2000s, a period that includes a prolonged and severe 
economic downturn, we prefer a less restrictive 15-year threshold.  




 Startup characteristics and outcome variables 2.4.2
Empirical studies on entrepreneurial firms face notorious data-collection challenges. 
Unlike older and publicly traded companies, information about entrepreneurial firms is more 
scattered and difficult to obtain. In light of this challenge, we integrate data from multiple 
sources. Key sources include the MEDC archives (for applicant-level information and 
reviewer scores), the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs database (for 
commercial viability), VenturXpert (for follow-on VC financing), SBIR awardee lists (for 
SBIR awards), and Delphion (for successful applications of U.S. patents). We supplement 
these data with searches of company websites, press releases, and news articles as needed.  
Information from these sources is used to compile three time-varying indicators of 
new venture performance: (1) whether the firm remains in business (i.e., “survives”) by time 
t; (2) its ability to secure financing from other third parties; and (3) its productivity in 
generating patents. Unfortunately, we lack reliable firm-level data on annual R&D 
expenditures and employment growth.  
Our first outcome variable, Survival, is based on the current status of companies 
listed in the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) database. 
Five main status types are listed: (1) active; (2) active but not in good standing; (3) dissolved; 
(4) withdrawn; and (5) merged. Fortunately, the database also indicates the date on which a 
firm switches type, if at all. For firms listed in categories other than “active,” we conducted 
supplemental searches of company websites and press release. This process helps ensure that 
a “dissolved” or “withdrawn” status does not simply reflect movement from the state or a 
re-organization via merger or acquisition. In ambiguous cases, we called the company to 
determine whether it was still in business. The LARA database also reports incorporation 




dates for Michigan-based companies, which we used to determine the ages of applicant-firms 
in our sample. 
A second outcome variable pertains to follow-on financing, and is used to test the 
“certification” hypothesis (Lerner, 1999; Wallsten, 2000)—that winning a competitive R&D 
award casts a positive signal to other investors, thus making it easier to attract other sources 
of financing.  Young science and technology companies seek financial capital from 
numerous sources. Prominent among those capital sources are grants from the SBIR and 
investments from VCs.  To identify SBIR awards to applicant-companies, we searched the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) TECH-Net database by company names, using 
company locations to ensure a match. We then compiled the number of SBA awards to each 
applicant company, including both Phrase I and Phrase II awards. For VC investments, we 
conducted similar searches of VentureXpert, a venture capital database commonly used in 
empirical research (e.g., Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Park and Steensma, 2012), company 
websites, and Zephyr, which includes news articles about VC deals since 1997. Since funding 
amounts were sparsely reported, our proxy for follow-on VC financing is based on the 
number of VC investment rounds, if any, listed for each firm. 
A third outcome variable, Patent Productivity, captures whether state R&D funding 
enhances the innovative productivity of participating firms. Although an imperfect measure 
of innovative output, patent counts capture the extent to which these startups succeed in 
producing novel and patent-worthy inventions from their R&D activities. By searching 
company names in the Delphion database, we assemble all U.S. patents awarded to these 
companies through 2012. The annual patent productivity of each company is based on the 
dates that issued patents are filed rather than granted, as is conventional practice in the 
literature.  




Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the entrepreneurial applicant-firm sample.  
On average, sample firms are quite young in the focal year of competition, at 4 years post-
founding. As expected from the program’s history, the life science sector represents the 
largest component of the applicant pool, filing almost half (49%) of all requests for funding. 
Roughly 21 percent of the applicants ceased operations due to business failure within four 
years of the competition year, which could reflect the liquidity constraints faced by 
Michigan-based companies in the recessionary period of the 2000s.  
2.5 Estimation Method  
Establishing a causal relationship between state R&D financing and the subsequent 
performance of new ventures poses well-known methodological challenges (David, Hall, & 
Toole, 2000; Klette et al., 2000). In light of that challenge, we employ multiple empirical 
approaches and estimation samples. First, we estimate “naïve regressions” that use the entire 
applicant-pool sample but control for observable characteristics of the firms pre-treatment. 
Then we use regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods to estimate effects with subsets 
of firms proximate to the cut-off in scores that determine the allocation of funding. 
Intuitively, we assume that omitted variable problems fall as more restrictions are imposed 
on the sample. The trade-off, of course, is that a corresponding decline in sample sizes, 
which could reduce estimation precision.  We therefore report results using multiple 
methods and samples and assess patterns among them. 
  Controlling for observables 2.5.1
Equation (1) represents our baseline model:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 = Φ(𝛼𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛿)                                         (1) 




𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 is the outcome variable of applicant i  in subsequent period t+1. 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is a 
binary variable that indicates whether the company was funded (1=funded; else=0). 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of applicant-level covariates that include the age of the firm in the competition year, 
the industrial sector, the application category (applied research vs. commercialization project), 
and competition-year fixed effects. Controlling for these observable firm-level characteristics, 
we estimate effects with the entire pool of entrepreneurial-firm applicants, including firms 
that sought but failed to receive an award. 
When the dependent variable is a binary variable such as an indicator of survival, 
where  𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑃(𝜆𝑖𝑡+1 = 1|𝑍𝑖𝑡)  and 𝜆  is the binary indicator, we use linear probability 
estimation with robust standard errors. Probit estimation is also used as a robustness check. 
When the dependent variable is a count (i.e., number of SBA awards, patents, or VC 
investments), we use a Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, again with robust 
standard errors. As Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) and Santos, Silvam, and 
Tenreyo (2006) report, Poisson QMLE outperforms OLS in terms of fit and robustness 
when dependent variables are non-negative and skewed.    
 Estimation near the discontinuity border 2.5.2
The second approach exploits the discontinuous breakpoint between external 
reviewer scores and funding probabilities more fully by invoking regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) methods widely used in labor and education economics (Lee & Lemieux, 
2010). Black, Galdo, and Smith (2007), for example, use discontinuities in treatment status to 
evaluate the effects of government training services on individuals in search of re-
employment. Implementing RDD in an instrumental variable framework, Jacob and Lefgren 
(2004) test the causal effects of educational remedial programs on the scholastic achievement 




of students. A separate body of research, more closely related to this study, uses RDD 
methods to discern how government R&D grants affect the career trajectories and 
productivity of individual scientists (Arora & Gambardella, 2005; Carter, Winkler, & Biddle-
Zehnder, 1987; Chudnovsky, López, Rossi, & Ubfal, 2008; Ubfal and Maffioli, 2011).  
In this study, we restrict attention to more comparable Round 2 applicants and 
define cutoff 𝑐𝑗𝑡  as the score above which companies are recommended for funding. We 
then subtract the cutoff from the second-round score of company i in application category j 
in year t, defined as 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡. This process yields a normalized score for each applicant, defined 
as 𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 - 𝑐𝑗𝑡.  
Intuitively, RDD methods let us compare the performance of companies that lie 
slightly above a discontinuity border with that of entities falling slightly below that border. 
We assume that companies within certain bandwidths of the cut-off border are more similar 
to one another (both on observable and unobserved characteristics) than they are to firms 
located at more distant points in the distribution (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Put differently, we 
assume that two companies with normalized scores of +50 and -50 (i.e., positive and 
negative outliers) are less comparable than two companies with normalized scores of +1 and 
-1, where both firms have scores close to the funding breakpoint.   
To infer causality using RDD methods in this setting, three assumptions must be 
met: (1) the cut-off score cannot be pre-determined and subject to manipulation by 
applicants; (2) the relationship between the score and the probability of funding must be 
non-linear (i.e., a breakpoint must exist); (3) applicant characteristics (both observed and 
unobserved) must be comparable in the cutoff region (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). 
As discussed earlier, an independent panel of external reviewers scores each funding 
proposal. The cut-off score is unknown to applicants in advance and can change across 




competitions:  it is largely driven by the total funds allocated to a competition in advance of 
solicitations for proposals and the amount of funds requested by high-ranked submissions. 
Therefore, assumption (1) is satisfied.  
Figure 2.3a and 2.3b suggest that assumption (2) is satisfied: the probability of 
receiving state R&D funding shifts discontinuously with external reviewer scores. Figure 2.3a 
is a lowess smoother with bandwidth 0.8. Figure 2.3b plots the mean of the binary variable 
“funded” over constant 10-unit intervals. Both figures reveal a visible and discontinuous 
pattern. 
Table 2.2 evaluates the comparability of firms just below and above the discontinuity 
border based on observable characteristics. Panel A of Table 2.2 reports mean values of 
applicant characteristics within 20-points of the discontinuous cutoff. Panel B reports similar 
statistics for the narrower 15-point bandwidth. Based on two-tailed t tests, the average pre-
treatment characteristics of the groups are statistically indistinguishable within 20-points 
bandwidth. The only exception is on the measure of whether the focal firms have VC fund 
or SBA award in year 1-2 prior to application, which is marginally significant with p value of 
0.07. When the sample is further narrowed down to 15-point bandwidth, the sample firms 
become more comparable since all pre-treatment characteristics are statistically 
indistinguishable. Despite the evidence in Table 2.2, it is possible of course that firms near 
the funding cutoff differ in unobserved ways likely to affect future performance. Lacking a 
direct test, we must assume that this latter requirement—of comparability in unobserved 
traits—is met (Lee & Lemieux, 2010). 




2.6 Findings  
To what extent, if at all, does receipt of state R&D financing improve the 
performance of technology startups? Does state R&D financing help mitigate imperfections 
in entrepreneurial capital markets? To shed empirical light on these questions, we present 
three sets of analyses that correspond to each outcome variable. The first set estimates the 
effects of state R&D awards on a crucial outcome variable for young technology companies: 
survival. A second set tests for “certification” effects on follow-on financing, both for SBA 
awards and VC investments. A final set tests whether state R&D financing bolsters the 
patent productivity of new ventures. 
  Effects on firm survival  2.6.1
Table 2.3 reports regression estimates of equations (1) with two time-periods of 
survival and the three applicant-firm samples discussed above. The dependent variable in 
Panel A and B is a binary indicator of whether an applicant is active (i.e., not in poor 
standing or disbanded) 2 and 4 years after the competition respectively. All regressions 
include year, sector and project category dummies as control variables.  
The results in Table 2.3 are quite striking.  Regardless of the survival period or 
estimation sample, applicants that receive state R&D financing are significantly more likely 
to survive than those that do not. Importantly, we find no evidence that this result is a 
simple artifact of the selection process. Even after the sample is narrowed to more 
comparable sets of firms (those proximate to the funding cutoff), Table 2.3 suggests that 
awardees are 12% to 13% more likely to survive 2 years and 21% to 23% more likely to 
survive 4 years following the competition than firms seeking but failing to receive such 
awards. The results are robust to the exclusion of 27 applicants with merger/acquisition exits 
and to the Probit regression estimations.  




We interpret this evidence as consistent with the view that state R&D financing 
relaxed the financial constraints for these companies: absent R&D funds from the state, 
otherwise-comparable companies were less likely to remain in business. It is also interesting 
to find that the magnitude of the R&D financing effect on survival is larger in the longer 
period (4-year vs. 2-year). It implies that the state funding may not just solve the short-term 
liquidity constraint of entrepreneurial firms, but could “add value” to recipient firms and 
increase their commercial viability in the long-run. To test this hypothesis more directly, we 
move to the second set of analyses.  
  Effects on follow-on financing  2.6.2
The second set of analyses tests the “certification hypothesis” that, by certifying new 
venture quality, state R&D awards reduce informational problems in markets for 
entrepreneurial capital and thereby stimulate the subsequent financing activities of young 
companies (Lerner, 1999; Feldman and Kenney, 2003). Table 2.4 reports the estimated effect 
of state R&D awards on follow-on financing from SBA and VC sources. Tables 2.5-2.8 test 
for heterogeneous effects within the sample: If state R&D awards certify quality to external 
capital providers, their effects should be more pronounced for startups with greater 
informational challenges in such markets.  
Turning first to Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) of Table 2.4 and the full 
entrepreneurial-applicant sample, the estimates suggest that conditional on survival, funded 
startups receive significantly more SBA awards and VC investments in the two years and 
four years following the competition.  
To disentangle certification from a potential “cherry-picking” effect, Table 2.4  
restricts the sample to more comparable subsets of firms near the discontinuity border in the 
remaining columns. Once the estimation sample is restricted to more comparable firms, we 




fail to discern a significant effect of the awards on follow-on financing activities from 
government/SBA (Cols. 2, 3, 5 and 6). For the follow-on financing from private/VC (Panel 
B) sources, Columns (8) and (9) show that awardees secure more VC funding than 
comparable non-awardees in the following two years. As shown in Columns (11) and (12), 
however, the difference disappears when we extend the observation period to four years. 
Although suggestive of a certification effect, this significant effect on VC investments in the 
two-year period following the competition could be due to the process used to select 
applicants for funding. As noted earlier, the ability to secure third-party financial 
commitments is among the criteria used in the selection process. From the evidence in Table 
2.4 alone, it is therefore difficult to discern whether the “cherry-picking” of firms with 
greater financing prospects for the awards or a “certifying” effect of award recipient to 
external sources of financing drives the results. 
If state R&D awards reduce informational problems in entrepreneurial capital 
markets (via certification), however, we should expect heterogeneous treatment effects 
within the sample. More specifically, the awards should “matter more” to new ventures 
facing wider the information gaps with potential capital providers.  
 To test the certification hypothesis more fully, we therefore identify three sources of 
firm-level variation likely to correlate with information asymmetry levels within the context 
of our study. Absent R&D financing from the state, startups with prior VC-backing or SBA 
awards should be better able than their unfunded counterparts to convey quality to external 
capital providers. If state R&D awards serve a quality-certification function, we therefore 
should expect their effects on follow-on financing to be more pronounced among startups 
lacking prior VC-backing or SBA awards. Similarly, the awards should be especially important 




for younger (versus older) startups given the relative lack of observable track records with 
which to convey performance-potential.  
 On a related point, Sorenson and Stuart (2001) and others suggest that (a) hubs of 
entrepreneurial activity house rich information about entrepreneurs and the resources for 
building new companies and that (b) such information transfers imperfectly across 
geographic distances. If true, we should expect less efficient (“thinner”) entrepreneurial 
capital markets farther away from hubs of entrepreneurial activity, therefore amplifying the 
certification value of R&D awards from the state.   
 To operationalize this final location-based test, we identify the headquarter location 
of applicants from MEDC documents and use VC investments reported in VentureXpert to 
measure hubs of entrepreneurial activity within the state.  Consistent with patterns reported 
across U.S. states (Sorenson and Stuart 2001), VC investments are spatially agglomerated 
within Michigan—with a dominant cluster near Ann Arbor, where the University of 
Michigan and most Michigan-based VCs are based.  We therefore define Driving Distance to 
VC hub as the number of miles (in 100s) between Ann Arbor and each applicant-firm’s 
headquarter location. As a robustness check, we categorize the VC hub as the greater Ann 
Arbor-Detroit Metro Area and use of indicator variables (inside/outside VC hub) and obtain 
similar findings.   
Tables 2.5-2.8 report results that sequentially interact Funded with the three variables 
discussed above:  (1) Has Prior VC or SBA Award, (2) Startup Age, and (3) Driving Distance to 
VC Hub.  For simplicity, we show results based on two estimation samples: (a) all 
entrepreneurial-applicants (i.e., the “full sample”) and (b) firms 15 or fewer points 
surrounding the normalized funding cutoff.  We show results for the 2-year period following 
the competition (t+2) and list them separately for SBA awards (in Table 2.5) and follow-on 




rounds of VC investment (in Table 2.6). Results on SBA awards for the 4-year period 
following the competition (t+4) are listed in Table 2.7 and results on VC investment for the 
same observation period are listed in Table 2.8.  
To synthesize key findings from Tables 2.5-2.8, Table 2.9 reports the estimated 
conditional effect of state R&D awards on follow-on financing for our most comparable 
subsample of firms—those closest to the funding threshold (i.e., the “15 bandwidth” 
companies). Standard errors and confidence intervals are computed with formulas reported 
in Hilbe (2008), given the non-linearity of the estimator. 
Turning first to Panel A of Table 2.9, the estimates suggest that receipt of state R&D 
financing significantly boosts the predicted levels of follow-on financing for entrepreneurial 
firms lacking prior VC-backing or SBA awards: among this subset of relatively disadvantaged 
companies, awardees received 3.78 times (=exp(1.33)) more follow-on SBA awards in the 4-
year period after the competition and 4.76 times (=exp(1.56)) more rounds of VC financing 
in the following 2 years, relative to otherwise comparable applicants that sought but failed to 
receive an award.  
As depicted in Figure 2.4a and Figure 2.5a, we fail to discern a significant effect of 
state R&D awards on the follow-on financing of applicants with prior VC or SBA funding, 
suggesting that the marginal effect of being “certified” by the state is negligible for such 
companies. 
In Panel B of Table 2.9, we expected to find that the conditional effect of state R&D 
awards would grow larger as distance from the VC hub increases. The evidence is only 
partially supportive of this view.  Similar to the findings in Panel A, Panel B suggests that the 
“certification” value of state  




R&D awards is negligible for startups located in better-developed markets for 
entrepreneurial capital (i.e., inside a hub of VC activity).  For those located outside the VC 
hub, however, the conditional effect of state R&D award on follow-on financing is 
statistically significant and increasing in distance—for other government (SBA) sources in 
both observation periods, but only for private (VC) sources in the short-term.  
More specifically, the point estimates in Panel B of Table 2.9 suggest that effect of 
state R&D financing on the securement of future SBA awards in the following two years is 
roughly 7 times (=exp(3.30)/exp(1.40)) larger for firms located 100 miles from the VC hub 
than it is for firms located only 50 miles from the hub. The corresponding effect is around 5 
times in the following four years. A similar effect on VC investment arises in the two-year 
period after the competition. The results show that effect of state R&D financing on the VC 
investment in the following two years is roughly 2 times (=exp(1.79)/exp(1.05)) larger for 
firms located 100 miles from the VC hub than it is for firms located only 50 miles from the 
hub. Although the magnitude of the effect also is increasing in distance for follow-on VC 
financing in four-year period (reported in the fourth column of Table 2.9, Panel B), the 
estimated effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Figure 2.4b and Figure 
2.5b plot these effects.  
Panel C of Table 2.9 similarly reveals partial evidence that state R&D awards “matter 
more” to the follow-on financing activities of younger companies.  Here, however, the effect 
is statistically significant for private/VC but not for government/SBA sources. As shown in 
Figure 2.4c, receipt of a state R&D award significantly boosts the number of VC financing 
otherwise predicted for young firms in years 1-2 after the competition. The magnitude of the 
effect decreases with age, however, and becomes insignificant when the firm is more than 3 
years old. 




Although the evidence in Tables 2.5-2.9 suggests that the effects of state R&D 
awards on follow-on financing can differ markedly for government/SBA and private/VC 
sources, it is generally consistent with the view that the “certification value” of the awards is 
higher in the presence of greater informational imperfections in external markets for 
entrepreneurial capital. 
 Effects on patent productivity  2.6.3
A final set of analyses in Table 2.10 investigates the effects of state R&D funding on 
patent productivity. Aided by funds from the state, startups should be able to proceed with 
R&D and commercialization activities more aggressively than otherwise possible. If true, 
receipt of state-government financing should enable awardees to yield more innovative 
output from their endeavors. To investigate this potential productivity effect, we test 
whether receipt of state-government financing increases the annual production of patented 
inventions by new ventures.  
Table 2.10 reports the patent productivity estimates using Poisson QMLE methods 
and the estimation samples defined earlier. Panel A estimates effects in the 2-year period 
following the competition, while Panel B allows for a longer 4-year window.  
In Columns (1) and (4) of Table 2.8, the Funded coefficient is a positive predictor of 
patent productivity but the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This result is 
surprising since it is based on the entire applicant pool. As noted earlier, scientific merit is 
one of the criteria used to score proposals include scientific merit. Assuming that such merit 
correlates with patenting potential, we should expect a positive and significant Funded 
coefficient simply as an artifact of the selection process. We fail, however, to discern this 
effect. The effect is not driven by differential survival rates of funded and unfunded 
companies. As a robustness check, we retained failed companies in the sample (with post-




exit patenting output coded as zero) and obtained similar results. Not surprisingly, the 
coefficient on Funded remains statistically insignificant in other columns of Table 2.10, where 
the estimation sample comprises more comparable firms.  
One explanation for this “non-finding” is measurement error. Small firms often 
submit provisional filings a year in advance of formal patent applications, which could make 
it more difficult to discern a near-term effect. As a robustness check, we re-estimated effects 
using the earliest date associated with each patented invention (including the date of 
provisional filings if any). The results were qualitatively unchanged.   
Similarly, it is logical to assume that many applicant-firms are commercializing 
technologies from Michigan-based universities. Since universities typically retain title to 
inventions originating from their labs, this could impose a downward bias on our patent-
based output measures.  To investigate this possibility, we use supplemental information 
from press releases and news articles to identify applicants (~36% of the full sample) 
founded by university faculty or formed to commercialize university inventions.  In 
supplemental analyses, we find no evidence that this source of measurement error explains 
the patent-related non-finding. 
A final, more plausible explanation is that the funds allocated by the state are used 
primarily to accelerate time-to-market rather than to discover and develop new products. In 
this event, patent-based estimates could underestimate the true productivity effects 
associated with the awards. Unfortunately, we lack reliable time-to-market indicators with 
which to investigate this issue further.  




2.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study investigates whether R&D financing from state-government sources 
improves the performance of technology startups. Using novel data on Michigan-based 
programs, we test for causal linkages between state R&D financing and new venture 
performance with multiple outcome variables and methods, including regression 
discontinuity design. Increasingly common within the field of economics (e.g., Black, 1999; 
Lee & Lemieux 2010), RDD methods remain under-utilized in the strategic management and 
entrepreneurial finance literatures.  
We present new and compelling evidence that these state-run R&D awards increased 
the commercial viability (i.e., survival) of award recipients relative to startups that sought but 
failed to receive such awards. We find little evidence that this survival effect is driven solely 
by the selection of “better” companies into awards. Proximate to the funding threshold, 
recipients and non-recipients are comparable based on observable pre-treatment 
characteristics. Nonetheless, state funding remains a positive and significant predictor of 
survival among these otherwise-comparable applicants. This evidence is consistent with the 
view that public R&D financing helps ameliorate imperfections in capital markets for 
entrepreneurial companies: absent R&D financing from the state, our findings suggest that 
otherwise comparable ventures were less likely to remain in business. 
The effects of state R&D awards on other salient outcomes for technology 
ventures—the production of patents and the securement of other third-party financing—are 
more ambiguous in the context of this study. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that state 
funds bolstered the patent productivity of recipient companies, an effect that could reflect 
the more applied and commercialization-focused orientation of the program. 




We do, however, find more nuanced effects on follow-on financing. In regressions 
that include all applicants in the estimation sample, receipt of state R&D financing correlates 
with greater follow-on financing activity in both the two-year and four-year periods 
following the award, from both public (SBA) and private (venture capital) sources. At first 
blush, this finding appears to confirm the “certification effect” shown in empirical studies of 
federal R&D programs (Feldman & Kelley, 2003; Lerner, 1999): winning public R&D 
competitions can cast a positive signal that helps attract additional sources of financing. We 
show, however that the overall effect dissipates in more comparable pre-treatment samples. 
This finding underscores the importance of taking into account potential “cherry picking” in 
the provision of entrepreneurial capital, a topic widely discussed in the program evaluation 
literature (Klette et al., 2000; Wallsten, 2000):  firms likely to attract other sources of 
financing typically receive higher scores and are more likely to receive funding.  
More consistent with the view that state R&D awards help certify the value of young 
companies to other capital providers, we observe heterogeneous treatment effects within the 
sample. In general, we find that state R&D awards “matter more” to the follow-on financing 
activities of firms that lack prior VC funding or SBA awards, are younger, and are located 
farther away from spatial hubs of entrepreneurial activities. Assuming that these firm-level 
traits correlate with greater inefficiencies in securing access to financial resources, this 
evidence is consistent with the view that public R&D financing can help ameliorate 
imperfections that arise in markets for entrepreneurial financing. 
This study is limited in ways that build a natural the stage for further research. Of 
particular note, our analysis is based on R&D awards from a single state in the decade of the 
2000s, when technology ventures faced tighter capital constraints than was true in the boom 
years of the late-1990s. From a policy perspective, this timing of the Michigan-based 




programs was fortuitous: it increased the odds of capital-market imperfections that public 
monies could help address (Lerner, 2009). If similar data were compiled for more 
longstanding government programs, future studies could investigate how the magnitude of 
private-sector outcomes associated with public R&D financing are altered by 
macroeconomic conditions. 
Future research also could probe more deeply into how the design of public R&D 
programs affects outcomes realized by program participations. In this respect, Michigan’s 
recent switch from a direct (provision of R&D financing) to an indirect (subsidization of 
private equity) model of entrepreneurial financing is particularly intriguing. Understanding 
the trade-offs of alternative vehicles for financing entrepreneurial-firm innovation, both 
within the United States and in other countries, remains a fruitful avenue for further 
investigation. 
Finally, while this study provides evidence on the private returns to state R&D 
awards, answers to larger policy-related questions remain unclear:  Is it optimal—from a 
social welfare perspective—to extend the survival period of new science and technology 
companies or to enhance the abilities of such companies to secure funds from other 
government and private sources?  Do these benefits outweigh the direct and indirect costs of 
the program? In general, our evidence suggests that Michigan’s competitive R&D awards 
involved more than simply “picking winners.” To investigate whether the intervention was 
justified from a policy perspective, a host of factors beyond the scope of our study must be 
considered.  
To conclude, although state governments are active financiers of new science and 
technology companies, little is known about their effects on new venture performance. 
Based on novel data for Michigan-based innovation programs, we find that state R&D 




financing increased the survival prospects of new ventures and helped stimulate the follow-
on financing of firms with wider information gaps in markets for entrepreneurial capital. 
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Figure 2.1 Average Size of MEDC Program Funding to Awardees 
 
 

















Figure 2.3 Effect of Peer Review Score on Probability of Receiving Funds 
2.3a Calculated with Lowess smoother (bandwidth 0.8)  
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Figure 2.4 Conditional Effects of State R&D Awards on Follow-on Financing (t+2)13 
2.4a:  Startup has (vs does not have) Prior VC$ or SBA Award 
2.4b Startup Distance from VC Hub within the State (in miles) 
 
2.4c Startup Age in Years (Application Year minus Founding Year) 
 
                                                 
13 Dashed lines indicate that the conditional effect is statistically insignificant. 




Figure 2.5 Conditional Effects of State R&D Awards on Follow-on Financing (t+4)14 
2.5a  Startup has (vs does not have) Prior VC$ or SBA Award 
2.5b Startup Distance from VC Hub within the State (in miles) 
 
2.5c Startup Age in Years (Application Year minus Founding Year) 
                                                 
14 Dashed lines indicate that the conditional effect is statistically insignificant. 



























Variable  Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Basic Information  
     Normalized score (1st Round)  297 -4.46 19.04 -58.5 32 
Normalized score (2nd Round)  152 -0.68 17.43 -79.5 31 
Funded  297 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Age in application year 297 4.29 4.03 0 15 
Sector = advanced auto 297 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Sector = alternative energy  297 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Sector = homeland security 297 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Sector = life science 297 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Application category = applied research project 297 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Application category = commercialization project  297 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Survival Status  
     Survival in the following year 1-2 297 0.89 0.31 0 1 
Survival in the following year 1-4 297 0.79 0.41 0 1 
SBA Awards 
     SBA awards (counts) in year 1-2 prior to application  297 0.43 1.20 0 10 
SBA awards (counts) in year 1- 4 prior to application  297 0.76 2.33 0 21 
SBA awards (counts) in the following year 1-2 297 0.57 1.43 0 10 
SBA awards (counts) in the following year 1-4 297 1.10 2.67 0 17 
VC Investment  
     No. of VC investments (count) in year 1-2 prior to application 297 0.43 1.79 0 15 
No. of VC investments (count) in year 1-4 prior to application 297 0.73 2.55 0 19 
No. of VC investments (count) in the following year 1-2 297 0.37 1.28 0 11 
No. of VC investments (count) in the following year 1-4 297 0.66 2.21 0 19 
VC or SBA Investment  
     Has VC Fund or SBA award in the year 1-2 prior to application  297 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Has VC Fund or SBA award in the year 1-4 prior to application  297 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Patent  
     Patent filed  (count) in year 1-2 prior to application  297 0.47 1.42 0 9 
Patent filed (count) in year 1-4 prior to application  297 0.79 2.41 0 20 
Patent filed  (count) in the following year 1-2 297 0.48 1.58 0 10 
Patent filed  (count) in the following year 1-4 297 0.80 2.63 0 17 
Geography  
     Driving distance from VC hub (unit=100 miles) 297 0.46 0.66 0 5.69 





Table 2.2 Summary Statistics – just above and below cutoff 
  Panel A   Panel B 
  Just Below cutoff (-20)  
Just above 





  Just Below cutoff (-15)  
Just above 






Mean Mean P-value 
 
Mean Mean P-value 
Basic Information  
       Normalized score (2nd Round)  -8.27 9.55 
  
-6.36 7.93 
 Funded  0.00 0.71 
  
0.00 0.72 
 Age in application year 4.16 3.50 0.33 
 
4.35 3.23 0.12 
Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 0.44 0.40 0.79 
 
0.41 0.42 0.98 
Pre-treatment Performance 
       SBA Awards (count) in year 1-2 prior to application  0.65 0.73 0.80 
 
0.78 0.53 0.42 
SBA Awards (count) in year 1-4 prior to application  1.31 1.15 0.80 
 
1.55 0.86 0.27 
No. of VC investments (count) in year 1-2 prior to application 0.31 0.99 0.10 
 
0.38 0.97 0.14 
No. of VC investments (count) in year 1-4 prior to application 0.94 1.38 0.46 
 
1.10 1.34 0.72 
Patent filed  (count) in year 1-2 prior to application  0.43 0.73 0.27 
 
0.38 0.61 0.34 
Patent filed  (count) in year 1-4 prior to application  0.76 1.09 0.43 
 
0.75 0.80 0.89 
Pre-treatment Dummy (mean = percentage) 
       Has SBA Award in year 1-2 prior to application?  0.20 0.33 0.12 
 
0.23 0.30 0.43 
Has SBA Award in year 1-4 prior to application?  0.24 0.33 0.29 
 
0.28 0.30 0.81 
Has VC Fund in year 1-2 prior to application? 0.18 0.23 0.53 
 
0.23 0.27 0.65 
Has VC Fund in year 1-4 prior to application? 0.22 0.28 0.48 
 
0.25 0.30 0.61 
Has VC Fund or SBA Award in year 1-2 prior to application? 0.35 0.51 0.07 
 
0.40 0.50 0.32 
Has VC Fund or SBA Award in year 1-4 prior to application? 0.43 0.54 0.23 
 
0.48 0.52 0.69 
Has patent filed in year 1-2 prior to application?  0.16 0.28 0.13 
 
0.18 0.27 0.29 
Has patent filed in year 1-4 prior to application?  0.22 0.31 0.31 
 
0.22 0.28 0.53 
        Observations  49 78     40 64   
 
  





Table 2.3 Linear Probability Regressions on Survival 
  Panel A: Survival 2 years after competition 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sample  Full Sample  20 Bandwidth 15 Bandwidth 
Funded  0.121*** 0.117** 0.129** 
 
(0.027) (0.050) (0.056) 
Age in application year  0.002 0.007 0.005 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Constant  0.920*** 0.869*** 0.861*** 
 
(0.042) (0.068) (0.078) 
Observations 297 127 104 
R2 0.067 0.077 0.109 
 
Panel B:  Survival 4 years after competition 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Sample  Full Sample  20 Bandwidth 15 Bandwidth 
Funded  0.225*** 0.230*** 0.213*** 
 
(0.038) (0.059) (0.063) 
Age in application year  0.008 0.012 0.015 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Constant  0.771*** 0.727*** 0.748*** 
 
(0.058) (0.085) (0.095) 
Observations 297 127 104 
R2 0.084 0.159 0.181 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Year, industry and application category dummies are included in all regressions 
  





Table 2.4  Poisson Regressions on Follow-on Financing 
  Panel A: SBA Awards (count) 
 
 In years 1-2 following the application  
 
In years 1-4 following the application  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Sample  Full Sample  20 Bandwidth 15 Bandwidth 
 
Full Sample  20 Bandwidth 15 Bandwidth 
Funded  0.829*** 0.119 0.154 
 
0.844*** 0.065 0.302 
 
(0.270) (0.383) (0.448) 
 
(0.284) (0.403) (0.398) 
Age in application year  0.087*** 0.075** 0.099*** 
 
0.053* 0.037 0.067** 
 
(0.026) (0.032) (0.031) 
 
(0.030) (0.037) (0.029) 
Constant  -1.657*** -1.119** -1.265** 
 
-0.864** -0.284 -0.743 
 
(0.385) (0.500) (0.623) 
 
(0.435) (0.538) (0.596) 
Observations 264 118 95 
 
235 109 88 
Pseudo R2 0.177 0.194 0.247 
 
0.143 0.182 0.256 
Log-likelihood -296.6 -161.4 -125.7 
 
-497.2 -263.2 -195.6 
  Panel B: VC Investments (count) 
 
 In years 1-2 following the application  
 
In years 1-4 following the application  
 
(7) (8) (9) 
 
(10) (11) (12) 
Sample  Full Sample  20 Bandwidth 15 Bandwidth 
 
Full Sample  20 Bandwidth 15 Bandwidth 
Funded  1.029*** 0.767* 0.854* 
 
0.963** 0.649 0.625 
 
(0.365) (0.419) (0.478) 
 
(0.415) (0.497) (0.557) 
Age in application year  0.012 -0.028 -0.010 
 
-0.026 -0.072 -0.061 
 
(0.036) (0.047) (0.059) 
 
(0.042) (0.055) (0.064) 
Constant  -0.337 -0.060 -0.169 
 
0.251 0.634 0.698* 
 
(0.403) (0.363) (0.375) 
 
(0.354) (0.393) (0.411) 
Observations 264 118 95 
 
235 109 88 
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.186 0.182 
 
0.235 0.223 0.233 
Log-likelihood -225.6 -138.3 -119.5  -339.4 -224.5 -194.2 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: 1. Year, industry and application category dummies are included in all regressions 









Table 2.5 Poisson Regressions on Follow-on SBA Awards with Interaction Effects (t+2) 
Sample Panel A: Full Sample    Panel B: 15 Bandwidth 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Funded 0.829*** 1.990*** 0.080 0.844* 
 
0.154 1.444 -0.506 0.314 
 
(0.270) (0.412) (0.308) (0.450) 
 
(0.448) (0.922) (0.458) (0.679) 
 Funded * Has prior VC or SBA award (prior 1_4) 
 
-2.045*** 





    
(1.001) 
   Has prior VC or SBA award (prior 1_4) 
 
1.879*** 





    
(0.794) 
   Funded * Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 
  
3.139*** 
    
3.806** 
 
   
(0.981) 
    
(1.519) 
 Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 
  
-3.070*** 
    
-3.604** 
 
   
(0.839) 
    
(1.399) 
 Funded*Age in application year 
   
-0.003 
    
-0.028 
    
(0.058) 
    
(0.072) 
Age in application year  0.087*** 0.046** 0.083*** 0.088** 
 
0.099*** 0.072** 0.105*** 0.112** 
 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.037) 
 
(0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.047) 
Constant -1.657*** -2.802*** -0.958*** -1.665*** 
 
-1.265** -2.694*** -0.636 -1.328** 
 
(0.385) (0.525) (0.330) (0.470) 
 
(0.623) (0.882) (0.545) (0.663) 
Observations 264 264 264 264 
 
95 95 95 95 
Pseudo R2 0.177 0.267 0.263 0.177 
 
0.247 0.295 0.309 0.248 
Log-likelihood -296.6 -264.0 -265.7 -296.6   -125.7 -117.7 -115.3 -125.6 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         Notes: 1. Year, industry and application category dummies are included in all regressions 
           2. All results are conditional on firm survival 
         





Table 2.6  Poisson Regressions on Follow-on VC Investment with Interaction Effects (t+2) 
Sample Panel A: Full Sample    Panel B: 15 bandwidth  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Funded 1.029*** 1.813*** 0.343 1.284** 
 
0.854* 1.560** 0.310 1.154** 
 
(0.365) (0.593) (0.492) (0.499) 
 
(0.478) (0.704) (0.669) (0.540) 
 Funded * Has prior VC or SBA award (prior 1_4) 
 
-1.526** 





    
(0.949) 
   Has prior VC or SBA award (prior 1_4) 
 
1.609*** 





    
(0.652) 
   Funded * Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 
  
2.011** 
    
1.476 
 
   
(0.886) 
    
(0.991) 
 Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 
  
-1.333** 
    
-0.611 
 
   
(0.589) 
    
(0.678) 
 Funded*Age in application year 
   
-0.072 
    
-0.105 
    
(0.073) 
    
(0.115) 
Age in application year  0.012 -0.039 0.035 0.035 
 
-0.010 -0.001 0.038 0.055 
 
(0.036) (0.049) (0.043) (0.040) 
 
(0.059) (0.087) (0.083) (0.095) 
Constant -0.337 -1.134** -0.010 -0.438 
 
-0.169 -0.755 -0.109 -0.330 
 
(0.403) (0.527) (0.458) (0.448) 
 
(0.375) (0.561) (0.493) (0.394) 
Observations 264 264 264 264 
 
95 95 95 95 
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.267 0.252 0.223 
 
0.182 0.200 0.209 0.187 
Log-likelihood -225.6 -212.0 -216.3 -224.8   -119.5 -117.0 -115.7 -118.8 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         Notes: 1. Year, industry and application category dummies are included in all regressions 
           2. All results are conditional on firm survival 
 
        





Table 2.7 Poisson Regressions on Follow-on SBA Awards with Interaction Effects (t+4) 
Sample Panel A: Full Sample    Panel B: 15 Bandwidth 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Funded 0.844*** 1.823*** 0.246 0.746 
 
0.302 1.328* -0.233 0.325 
 
(0.284) (0.449) (0.299) (0.488) 
 
(0.398) (0.717) (0.421) (0.603) 
 Funded * Has prior VC or SBA award (prior 1_4) 
 
-1.925*** 





    
(0.823) 
   Has prior VC or SBA award (prior 1_4) 
 
1.576*** 





    
(0.632) 
   Funded * Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 
  
2.389** 
    
3.379** 
 
   
(1.109) 
    
(1.372) 
 Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 
  
-2.710*** 
    
-3.649*** 
 
   
(0.994) 
    
(1.278) 
 Funded*Age in application year 
   
0.018 
    
-0.004 
    
(0.062) 
    
(0.068) 
Age in application year  0.053* 0.015 0.051* 0.046 
 
0.067** 0.043 0.059* 0.069 
 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.045) 
 
(0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.046) 
Constant -0.864** -1.707*** -0.183 -0.818 
 
-0.743 -1.781** -0.049 -0.753 
 
(0.435) (0.580) (0.342) (0.516) 
 
(0.596) (0.725) (0.523) (0.632) 
Observations 235 235 235 235 
 
88 88 88 88 
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.224 0.233 0.144 
 
0.256 0.294 0.336 0.256 
Log-likelihood -497.2 -450.2 -445.1 -497.0   -195.6 -185.4 -174.4 -195.6 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         Notes: 1. Year, industry and application category dummies are included in all regressions 
           2. All results are conditional on firm survival 
        





Table 2.8 Poisson Regressions on Follow-on VC Investment with Interaction Effects (t+4) 
Sample Panel A: Full Sample    Panel B: 15 Bandwidth 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Funded 0.963** 1.648** 0.260 1.240** 
 
0.625 1.091 0.127 0.909 
 
(0.415) (0.729) (0.579) (0.569) 
 
(0.557) (0.825) (0.747) (0.667) 
 Funded * Has prior VC or SBA award (prior 1_4) 
 
-1.395* 





    
(0.842) 
   Has prior VC or SBA award (prior 1_4) 
 
1.421** 





    
(0.736) 
   Funded * Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 
  
2.007** 
    
1.325 
 
   
(0.903) 
    
(1.134) 
 Driving distance to VC hub (100s miles) 
  
-1.251* 
    
-0.547 
 
   
(0.706) 
    
(0.890) 
 Funded*Age in application year 
   
-0.084 
    
-0.107 
    
(0.085) 
    
(0.117) 
Age in application year  -0.026 -0.067 0.006 0.004 
 
-0.061 -0.053 -0.005 0.002 
 
(0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 
 
(0.064) (0.077) (0.089) (0.091) 
Constant 0.251 -0.440 0.524 0.128 
 
0.698* 0.354 0.701 0.544 
 
(0.354) (0.614) (0.392) (0.416) 
 
(0.411) (0.679) (0.482) (0.477) 
Observations 235 235 235 235 
 
88 88 88 88 
Pseudo R2 0.235 0.274 0.269 0.239 
 
0.233 0.243 0.256 0.238 
Log-likelihood -339.4 -322.3 -324.3 -337.8   -194.2 -191.8 -188.4 -192.9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         Notes: 1. Year, industry and application category dummies are included in all regressions 
           2. All results are conditional on firm survival 
        





Table 2.9 Conditional Effects of State R&D Awards on Follow-on Financing 





Panel A: Had prior VC or SBA? 
     Yes -0.2 -0.06 
 
0.3 0.19 
No 1.44 1.33* 
 
1.56** 1.09 
Panel B: Distance to VC Hub 
    Distance = 0  -0.51 -0.23 
 
0.31 0.13 
Distance = 50 miles 1.40** 1.46** 
 
1.05** 0.79 
Distance = 100 miles 3.30** 3.15** 
 
1.79*** 1.45 
Distance = 150 miles  5.20** 4.84** 
 
2.52** 2.12 
Distance = 200 miles  7.11** 6.53** 
 
3.26** 2.78 
Panel C: Firm Age in Application Year 
    Age = 0 0.31 0.33 
 
1.15** 0.91 
Age = 1 0.29 0.32 
 
1.05** 0.80 
Age = 2  0.26 0.32 
 
0.94** 0.70 
Age = 3 0.23 0.31 
 
0.84* 0.59 
Age = 4 0.20 0.31 
 
0.73 0.48 
Age = 5 0.17 0.30   0.63 0.37 
Notes: 1. Estimations are based on sample within 15-point of the awards cutoff score  
            2. Conditional effects in the four columns(from left to right above) are based on regression results reported in  
               Panel B of Tables 2.5, 2.7, 2.6, 2.8, correspondingly.  
 
  
























  Panel A: # of Patents filed in years 1-2 following the application  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sample  Full Sample  20 Bandwidth 15 Bandwidth 
Funded  0.529 0.140 0.026 
 
(0.413) (0.536) (0.771) 
Age in application year  0.072* 0.052 -0.056 
 
(0.039) (0.059) (0.067) 
Constant  -1.787*** -2.025*** -1.654** 
 
(0.586) (0.636) (0.719) 
Observations 264 118 95 
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.180 0.168 
Log-likelihood -312.2 -156.2 -119.4 
 
Panel B: # of Patents filed in years 1-4 following the application  
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Sample  Full Sample  20 Bandwidth 15 Bandwidth 
Funded  0.538 0.226 0.191 
 
(0.403) (0.582) (0.760) 
Age in application year  0.058 0.032 -0.082 
 
(0.038) (0.058) (0.062) 
Constant  -1.452** -1.698*** -1.172* 
 
(0.587) (0.617) (0.692) 
Observations 235 109 88 
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.211 0.180 
Log-likelihood -428.4 -218.2 -167.0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *  p<0.1 
  Notes: 1. Year, industry and application category dummies are included in all regressions 
           2. All results are conditional on firm survival  




CHAPTER 3  
FOUNDING ENVIRONMENT AND NEW VENTURE SURVIVAL: THE ROLE 
OF STATE INNOVATION PROGRAMS1 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The phase between idea discovery and commercialization can be treacherous for new 
science and technology companies (Kerr & Nanda, 2009a; Shane & Stuart, 2002). In order to 
survive, new ventures must be able to steer their product ideas across the “valley of death” 
— a difficult transition period when a developing technology is too new to validate its 
commercial potential and therefore may be unable to attract the capital and other resources 
necessary to bring it to the market (Audretsch et al., 2002a; Wessner, 2005). Aimed at 
stimulating entrepreneurial activity within their borders, US state governments, joint with 
other organizations, have launched large-scale initiatives since the mid-1980s to alleviate 
imperfections in markets for entrepreneurial resources and aid new ventures during this 
critical stage of their development  
Despite the popularity of these programs with policymakers, systematic evidence 
regarding the effects of state innovation programs on entrepreneurial firms remains lacking 
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Champaign, the University of Michigan, the University of Oregon, Peking University, Tsinghua University, and 
the University of Western Ontario. Meng Lu and Mitch Beckman provided excellent research assistance. 
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(Brander, Du, & Hellmann, 2011; Lerner, 2009). Unlike federal initiatives such as the Small 
Business Investment Research (SBIR) program (Audretsch, Link, & Scott, 2002b; Lerner, 
1999; Wallsten, 2000), information on programs at the state level is fragmented and thus 
cumbersome to assemble. In addition, teasing apart the causal effect of these programs is 
complicated by the absence of viable control group for comparison. Given the increased 
prominence of state governments in creating and administering entrepreneurship programs, 
understanding the effect of state innovation programs on entrepreneurial firms is critical 
from both a practical (policy/managerial) and scholarly perspective. 
In this study, I investigate the extent to which these state initiatives improve the 
founding environment of entrepreneurial firms and, in turn, enhance the post-entry survival 
of startups. To explore this research question, I compile program information from Great 
Lakes states and investigate the impact of major innovation programs on life sciences 
startups. To identify the causal effect of these initiatives on entrepreneurial firms, I first 
divide the sample into two cohorts: entrants founded when an innovation program is present 
and entrants founded without the presence of a program. After controlling for observable 
differences between these two cohorts, the founding environment should then be the main 
reason for any differences in survival patterns between the two cohorts. I further divide both 
cohorts into two subsamples: startup companies and new subsidiaries. Since state innovation 
programs mainly target at technology-based startup companies, new subsidiaries founded 
during the same time period provide a natural baseline for measuring program effects on 
startups.   
The results indicate that, after controlling for observable firm-level, industry-level, 
and macroeconomic-level factors, startup companies founded when an active state 
innovation program is underway are more likely to survive than startups established in the 




absence of an active state program within my observation period. This evidence suggests 
that the founding environment altered by these programs affects startup companies’ survival 
prospects. In addition, I find that the effect of programs on new venture survival is more 
pronounced for biopharmaceutical companies, which have higher resource requirements in 
moving to commercialization, than for medical device companies. Indeed, for medical device 
companies, the impact of state innovation programs decays significantly over time. This 
result suggests that innovation programs may lower barriers to entry and thus encourage 
more marginal startups in the medical device industry that are not able to survive in the long 
run.   
This study contributes to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to a growing 
literature in strategy and economics on how institutional and policy changes affect 
entrepreneurial firms and how public sector intervention impacts market failure (Aghion, 
Fally, & Scarpetta, 2007; Kerr & Nanda, 2009b). Prior studies on entrepreneurship have 
explored the effects of institutional changes on entrepreneurial firms. Specifically, empirical 
research based on institutional theory shows that entrepreneurial behavior and performance 
hinge on the institutional environment within which firms were founded (Eesley, 2009; 
Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011). Most of the evidence from this stream of research is based on 
institutional or policy reforms, such as non-competition law changes (Marx, Strumsky, & 
Fleming, 2009; Samila & Sorenson, 2011a), banking deregulations (Kerr & Nanda, 2009a, 
2010), changes of trade secrets laws (Png, 2011) or  intellectual property reforms (Cockburn 
& MacGarvie, 2009; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). However, these studies do not provide 
systematic evidence on the effect of institutional changes resulting from public efforts to 
create a more hospitable environment for entrepreneurial firms. 




Second, the study is salient to the literature on the association between founding 
environment and post-entry performance (Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echambadi, 2002; Audretsch 
& Mata, 1995; Geroski, Mata, & Portugal, 2010; Mata, Portugal, & Guimarães, 1995; Sarkar, 
Echambadi, Agarwal, & Sen, 2006; Swaminathan, 1996). This study provides the first 
systematic, cross-state evidence about whether a regime shift in the institutional environment 
engendered by public efforts can causally affect entrepreneurial firms’ subsequent survival 
prospects. 
In addition to its contributions to current entrepreneurship research, this study 
provides insights for managers of entrepreneurial firms and policymakers. From a managerial 
perspective, it is important to know the performance implications of startup companies 
when major state programs are active, so appropriate decisions can be made about whether, 
where, and when to start a company. From a policy perspective, it is beneficial for 
policymakers to know whether these entrepreneurship programs encourage “marginal” 
entrants (i.e., less promising entrants that exit quickly) or if they have long-term positive 
effects for entrepreneurial firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 explains the theoretical 
framework and develops hypotheses for this study. Section 3 describes the empirical context, 
data and methodology. I present results in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.  
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses   
 Founding environment and post-entry performance  3.2.1
New ventures in high-tech industries often face a resource gap between technology 
development and commercialization.  This resources gap occurs due to market 




imperfections caused by an information gap between the firm and private sector resource 
providers (Moore & Garnsey, 1993; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).  
The information gap may systematically deter private investment in early stage 
technology development (Arrow, 1962; Nelson & Romer, 1996; Zeckhauser, 1996). 
Entrepreneurial firms that are characterized by significant intangible assets, expect years of 
negative earnings, and have uncertain prospects are unlikely to receive bank loans or other 
debt financing (Audretsch et al., 2002a; Lerner, 2009). Therefore, the asymmetric information 
problem between entrepreneurial firms and investors renders resource providers in private 
sector unable to make appropriate decisions regarding when and where to invest and hence 
reluctant to make investments. Moreover,  many startup companies based on advanced 
technologies are founded by technical specialists, who have different objectives and reward 
structures than people focused on commercialization (Markham, 2002). When the founders 
are technically-focused and the investors are commercially-focused, this creates a difference 
in objectives that makes it challenging to translate research findings into successful products.  
This issue is compounded by the spatial difference of entrepreneurial resources 
(Almeida & Kogut, 1997; Chen, Gompers, Kovner, & Lerner, 2010; Fleming, King, & Juda, 
2007). In some regions, such as the Great Lakes states, the human capital and technology “at 
risk” of commercializing are geographically distributed, where numerous top-ranked 
universities and research institutions are housed (Austin and Affolter-Caine 2006).  Yet the 
resources required for commercialization remains lacking in these regions. From 1995 to 
2009, for example, Great Lakes states received 11.5 percent of the total NIH funding while 
only 3.9 percent of venture capital (VC) investment in life sciences sector was invested there. 
In the same time period, California and Massachusetts received 25.8 percent of the total 
NIH funding while 56.2 percent of venture capital investment was agglomerated in those 




two states.2  Other resources such as law, accounting and service firms also tend to collocate 
with each other, which increase the resource gap in these regions (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003a). 
For these reasons, technology-based startups face a major challenge in identifying 
and accumulating the resources necessary to help them bridge the valley of death and survive. 
Previous literature has linked environmental conditions at founding directly to new ventures’ 
post-entry performance and commercial viability (i.e., survival). For example, Romanelli 
(1989) concludes that the greater availability of environmental resources at founding 
significantly influences the likelihood of an organization’s survival. In particular, Brito and 
Mello (1995) find evidence that availability of external capital links directly to firm post-entry 
performance. In another study, Sarkar, Echambadi, Agarwal & Sen (2006) show that the 
aligned state of the innovative environment, where product innovation exists in tandem with 
abundant innovation opportunities, increases chances of survival. Moreover, Lerner (2009) 
finds that founders and entrepreneurial investors (e.g., venture capitalists) benefit from the 
sharing of experience and knowledge across peers. For instance, if entrepreneurs are already 
active in a given region, then investors, employees, and intermediaries such as lawyers, 
regulatory experts, and data providers are likely to be knowledgeable about the venture 
process and what strategies, financing, support, and exit mechanisms a new venture requires. 
As a consequence, new ventures founded in this environment can accumulate more 
resources to cross the difficult valley of death period.  
 State innovation programs, founding environment and new venture survival  3.2.2
In order to mitigate market imperfections faced by entrepreneurial firms and to help 
them bridge the valley of death, state innovation programs seek to address two perceived 
                                                 
2 Calculated by the author using NIH RePORT and VentureXpert data.  




sources of market imperfections: capital constraints and other entrepreneurial factor input 
constraints.  
State innovation programs shape the entrepreneurial founding environment through 
various mechanisms including direct funding to startup companies, funding to research 
institutions, funding to intermediary organizations, funding to VCs and other private parties, 
and tax credits for startups or investors. State innovation programs often employ several of 
these mechanisms, which can be categorized as either mechanisms aimed at addressing 
imperfections in the entrepreneurial capital market or mechanisms aimed at addressing 
weaknesses in the broader factor input market for entrepreneurial firms.  
In mitigating the imperfections of entrepreneurial capital market and reduce initial 
capital constraints of new ventures, state programs provide indirect certification of the 
quality of a new technology through their provision of funding to a firm (Feldman & Kelley, 
2003; Lerner, 1999; Zhao & Ziedonis, 2012). To further mitigate information gap and 
reconcile asymmetric interests between startups and potential private investors, various 
intermediary organizations established by state innovation programs play the role of linking 
entrepreneurial firms with potential investors and other resources necessary for 
commercialization. Public-private interaction at the founding stage of new ventures is 
especially helpful for mitigating market imperfections.   
In mitigating other entrepreneurial factor input constraints, state programs provide 
entrepreneurial services, incubator support, and increase the availability of human capital 
(e.g., managers, lawyers, and regulatory experts) to help accelerate a firm’s shift from a 
technology focus to a market focus. Bridging the valley of death not only requires “bridge 
capital,” it also requires shifting quickly to a market focus and getting a better understanding 
of private sector risk perspectives. 




Therefore, state innovation programs use multiple mechanisms to provide capital, 
credibility, talent, services, and facilities and seek to create a more favorable founding 
environment to entrepreneurial firms.  If these innovation programs can mitigate 
imperfections in the entrepreneurial resource market, after controlling for changes of market 
competition and intensive margin of entry (e.g., entrant size) at founding, the effect of these 
mechanisms on firm survival would be predicted to be positive. Hence, I arrive at the 
following hypotheses.   
• Hypothesis 1: Companies founded when an active program exists will have a 
higher survival rate than startups established in the absence of such a 
program 
Keeping this baseline hypothesis in mind, a second related question is whether the 
effect of state innovation programs on startup firms is relatively fleeting or more long-lasting. 
To answer this question, I take a close look at the types of new ventures founded and the 
resources provided by these innovation programs, and theoretically predict their consequent 
effects on average firm survival rates in both the short and long run.    
The effect of state innovation programs on firm survival depends on how the 
availability of a favorable founding environment helps firms.  For potentially less promising 
firms, a favorable founding environment may solve immediate liquidity constraints but will 
not help them bridge the valley of death.  Consequently, these firms will show a higher 
short-term survival rate but a lower survival rate in the long run. 
By contrast, for more promising firms, a favorable founding environment will not 
only help with immediate financial constraints but will provide additional resources that will 
help them bridge the resource gap and thus increase their long-term survival rate.  In other 
words, if resources accumulated at their founding stages help new ventures successfully 




transit from a technology focus to a market focus, cross the valley of death, and attract 
follow-up commercialization resources from the private sector, then these startup companies 
are very likely to survive in the long run.  
Public resources provided by state innovation programs may lower the entry barriers 
and increase the proportion of less promising startups established after the program launch. 
These startups are expected to show much higher exit rate in the long run, which will 
partially offset program positive effect on average survival rate. Therefore, the overall effect 
of such programs on the average survival rate would be expected to decrease over the long 
term.  This leads to my next hypothesis. 
• Hypothesis 2: The difference in survival rates between startup companies 
founded when an active state innovation program exists and startups 
established in the absence of such a program will diminish over time.  
 Heterogeneous effects within the life sciences industry   3.2.3
Startup companies in different industries face different resource gaps. Within the life 
sciences industry, although medical device and biopharmaceutical startup companies may 
face the same valley of death problem, there is a meaningful difference between these two 
sectors. In general, innovations in the medical device sector are much less risky than their 
counterparts in the biopharmaceutical sector, since medical devices enjoy lower development 
costs, shorter product development times and less regulatory approval risk.  (Ackerly, 
Valverde, Diener, Dossary, & Schulman, 2009). For example,  medical device product 
development time averages only about 33 to 50 percent of the time required for drug 
development (Rosen, 2008). Research shows that it takes medical device companies an 
average of 113 days to go through the FDA 510(k) application process, compared to an 




average of 322 days to go through the FDA new drug approval process (Downing et al., 2012; 
MassDevice, 2009). Furthermore, the survey, conducted on twenty experienced fund 
managers whose funds have been invested in more than 1100 companies in health care 
sectors, shows that they view the medical device sector as a sector with lower risk, compared 
to the biopharmaceutical sector (Ackerly et al., 2009).  
Therefore, the medical device sector has lower resource requirements for 
commercialization, less uncertainty, and a lower entry barrier. On the other hand, 
entrepreneurs in the biopharmaceutical sector face a higher entry barrier, higher product 
development costs, and a wider gap between the development and commercialization stages.   
Since medical device companies have fewer resource requirements and regulatory 
restrictions in bringing their technology ideas from the lab to the market, the presence of a 
state innovation program may encourage more marginal startups to be founded in this 
industry.  By contrast, given the higher barriers to entry and commercialization challenges in 
the biopharmaceutical industry, a state innovation program would not be expected to 
encourage as many risky biopharmaceutical startups relative to the medical device industry.  
These differences between medical device and biopharmaceutical startups lead to my third 
hypothesis on the effect of state innovation programs on firm survival.  
• Hypothesis 3: The program effects will be more pronounced in sub-sectors 
with greater resource requirements for commercialization. 
 




3.3  Method 
 Empirical context 3.3.1
My study focuses on the effect of state innovation programs in the Great Lakes 
region3 on startups in the life sciences industry for the following reasons. First, life sciences 
startup companies, which face a long and costly product development process, provide an 
ideal sample to investigate the effect of state innovation programs intended to help new 
ventures bridge the resource gap.  
Second, the Great Lakes states face common economic challenges owing to the 
prolonged decline of their manufacturing industries.  In addition, these states are each 
endowed with major assets such as a strong research, innovation, and talent cultivation 
infrastructure. Entrepreneurial ideas and human capital in the life sciences sector—
universities, major hospitals and medical institutions, and incumbent firms—are widely 
distributed throughout the Great Lakes region. However, entrepreneurial resources remain 
lacking in this area.  
Finally, state governments in the Great Lakes region have been very active in 
launching innovation programs since the mid-1980s. As described in the data section, all the 
focal states in the region launched at least one program with a budget of more than $1 
billion during the sample period. These types of programs, which embrace the concept of 
“economic gardening,” focus on new firms and technology development and build up 
“startup communities” and “entrepreneurial systems” (Plosila, 2004).  
                                                 
3 The Great Lakes region is one of the eight distinct regions defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), and includes five states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. The BEA groups 50 states 
and the District of Columbia into regions for the purpose of data collection and analysis. 




  Data  3.3.2
Using the life sciences industry in the Great Lakes region as my empirical context, I 
employ multiple data sources to construct a unique dataset to address my research questions. 
To obtain a “big picture” overview of innovation programs in the Great Lakes states and to 
define major programs based on size, I compile historical information about these programs 
from a combination of archives and websites. I then supplement this program information 
with a dynamic establishment-level panel dataset that includes all medical devices and 
biopharmaceutical establishments located in the Great Lakes region during the period 1990-
2009.  
To collect state program information, I first use Berglund and Cohurn (1995)4, the 
State Science and Technology Institute (SSTI) archives 5 , and government economic 
development websites to identify innovation programs during this period in the Great Lakes 
region. I next cross-check this information by searching Battelle/Bio State Bioscience 
Initiatives reports, Google archives, and Factiva to eliminate programs that were announced 
but never implemented. I then use key information about these programs obtained from 
program descriptions, program reports, and press releases to identify relevant program 
characteristics. This information includes program starting year, ending year (if any), and 
total budget commitment. I collect information on all program types to provide a broad 
vantage point from which to view the evolution and range of these programs, and then 
narrow my focus to programs with a major component related to the life sciences industry.  
                                                 
4 Berglund and Cohurn(1995)’s compendium of state and federal cooperative technology programs provides an 
early attempt to describe and classify state programs and is the most comprehensive source for historical 
information about state innovation programs launched before 1995. Building upon that seminal effort, SSTI 
provides a wealth of information accessible through the SSTI archives, a central digital repository classified by 
state (Feldman, Lanahan & Lendel, 2012).  
5 Source: http://www.ssti.org/Digest/Indices/indexstate.php?page=indextext2 (accessed August 17, 2012) 




Table 3.1 lists state innovation programs with an initial total budget larger than 20 
million dollars launched between 1990 and 2009 in four focal Great Lakes states: Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Wisconsin does not have a pivotal program; instead, it has 
many programs housed in various units of the Department of Economic Developments.6  
Based on the distribution of program size as measured by their budgets, I define programs 
with a budget of more than 500 million dollars as “major” programs7. As shown in Table 3.1, 
compared to major programs, other programs are much smaller. The average size of these 
major state innovation programs is $1.6 billion, and total budget of all rest programs is only 
$985 million. During the observation period, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio each launched one 
major program while Michigan launched two. However, since the second program in 
Michigan was launched in 2006, the time window is not yet long enough to effectively assess 
post-entry performance for the cohort of entrants established after the program launch. 
Thus, I limit my focus for Michigan to the program launched in 1999.  
Figure 3.1 plots the timing of major state innovation programs relative to real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth by state. In Illinois, the VentureTECH program was 
launched in 2000 when GDP growth had declined from around 5.9 percent in 1997 to 3.5 
percent in 2000, and continued to decrease in 2001. Indiana launched its major program in 
2002 when the state GDP was climbing from -1.7 percent in 2001 to 2.7 percent in 2002, 
and continued to growth in 2003. Michigan and Ohio launched their major programs at a 
turning point when the state GDP growth rates are lower both before and after that year.  
From Figure 3.1, it is clear that the timing of major program launch in the focal states does 
                                                 
6   For example, Wisconsin had 152 State Economic Development Programs from 2001 to 2004. In 2011 it has 
more than 25 separate business development programs administered by the Division of Business Development. 
7 The threshold and list of major programs do not change after I convert all budgets into constant-dollars. In 
terms of 2009 constant dollars, the average size of major programs is 1.9 billion and the total budget of all rest 
programs is $1.1 billion.   




not have a strong correlation with the trend of state economy.  In some cases, the program 
was launched when the state economy was growing stronger, while in other cases, the 
program was established in a period of decline. Large state initiatives launched at different 
times help to identify the program effects from common industrial or macro-economic 
trends that may affect the performance of entrepreneurial firms.  
To obtain information on the new ventures in this study, I use the National 
Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database to track the new ventures’ entry, exit, and post-
entry performance in the Great Lakes region. The NETS database is compiled by Walls 
Associates using Dun and Bradstreet’s (D&B’s) Market Identifier (DMI) file and includes 
annual snapshots beginning with January 1990. The NETS database covers nearly every 
business unit that has operated in the United States over the past two decades and provides 
rich information such as business name, address, headquarter, year active, industry 
classification, type of establishment, employment, sales, and other indicators. Compared to 
government data based on ES-202 unemployment insurance filings, NETS provides better 
coverage of young and/or small firms (Kunkle, 2011). 
To identify those ventures in the life sciences industry, I use the 2006 Biosciences 
Industry Report. This report provides a definition of the life sciences industry that has been 
widely accepted and used by various industry and government reports. It also lists detailed 6-
digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes for each sub-sector in 
the life sciences industry. I use these NAICS codes to select and construct comprehensive 
panel data that includes all entrants in the (1) biopharmaceutical and (2) medical device 
sectors that were founded in the focal Great Lakes region between 1990 and 2009.   
Figure 3.2 plots the number of life sciences entrants in the Great Lakes region– 
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin – from 1990 to 2009. The average number 




of entrants per year is 347, with a minimum of 259 entrants and a maximum of 534. As 
shown in Table 3.2, in addition to Sector I biopharmaceuticals (NAICS 325411-325414), I 
further divide the medical devices industry into two subsectors (Sectors II and III) based on 
their four-digit NAICS codes. These two subsectors belong to NAICS 3345 “navigational, 
measuring, electromedical, and control instruments manufacturing” and NAICS 3391 
“medical equipment and supplies manufacturing”, respectively.   
Although all belong to the life sciences industry, firms in these three industry 
subsectors have different R&D intensities. Based on the average R&D intensity figures by 4-
digit NACIS codes for 1999-2003 from the “Survey of Industrial Research and 
Development,” published by the National Science Foundation (NSF), the R&D intensities 
for Sectors I, II and III are 7.8, 12.3, and 6.3 percent, respectively, compared to the average 
R&D intensity for all industries of 3.7 percent.   
 There are several advantages to using a combination of historical program 
information and NETS data to investigate the effects of state innovation programs on new 
venture creation and post-entry performance. First, NETS data cover almost all new 
establishments, including new ventures and subsidiaries, in the sectors of interest, and are 
representative of the whole population of establishments. It follows their post-entry 
performance for a decade and allows me to construct the industry-level control variables that 
are important to this study. Second, the dynamic nature of this dataset enables me to better 
investigate time-related effects such as the short-term and long-term effects of state 
programs, while controlling for other time-variant factors. Finally, the use of objective and 
archival state innovation program data from various sources ensures that this study does not 
suffer from the potential self-reporting bias of survey-based data. 




  Sample construction 3.3.3
Since the NETS database is constructed by taking a series of “snapshots” of Dun 
and Bradstreet (D&B) data every January, my sample is based on snapshots taken from 
January 1991 to January 2010. If the first year an establishment appears in the D&B 
databases is January 1991, the starting year of this establishment is assumed to be 1990. All 
establishments founded in the four focal Great Lakes states after 1990 are followed until 
they exit from the database or until the end of the observation period8.  
The sample used in this study includes two types of entrants: new ventures (startup 
companies) and new subsidiaries. I distinguish startup companies and new subsidiaries by 
comparing the unique IDs (i.e., DUNS numbers from D&B database) of the entrants to 
their headquarters’ unique IDs. For startup companies, their DUNS number is equal to the 
DUNS number of their headquarters, since the startup company is its headquarter. By 
contrast, for new subsidiaries, D&B assigns new DUNS numbers that differ from those of 
their headquarters. Entrants that moved out of their home states during the observation 
period are excluded from the estimation sample.  
In order to identify the effects of state innovation programs on entrepreneurial 
firms, I create two cohorts. Pre-launch Cohort is defined as entrants founded when a major 
state program is active; this cohort consists of establishments founded within three years 
after the launch of a major innovation program.  Post-launch Cohort is defined as entrants 
founded when there is no active major state program. This cohort includes all establishments 
founded three years before the launch of a major state program.  
                                                 
8 The unique identification number at establishment level allows me to follow every active entrant even if it was 
merged or acquired. 




3.3.3.1  Variable definitions  
The final dataset consists of all Pre-launch and Post-launch Cohort entrants from 
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. The total number of new ventures in the sample is 
1555, including 1226 startup companies and 329 new subsidiaries. Table 3.3 shows the 
number of entrants and startups in each cohort in my sample. As expected, Post-launch 
Cohort contains more startups than Pre-launch Cohort in all four states, which means that 
there are more startup companies established after the major program launch. Overall, 53 
percent of startups are established within three years after the program launch, compared to 
47 percent established within three years before the program.    
3.3.3.2  Dependent variable: survival or hazard rate  
Based on previous literature, in order to investigate whether founding environment 
shaped by state innovation programs can be effective in helping startups to bridge the valley 
of death, the most direct outcome measure is survival. Since well-performing companies 
survive while poor performers exit, survival is a good proxy for performance (Penrose, 1952; 
Williamson, 1991). Additionally, studies in the fields of industrial organization, strategy, and 
sociology have considered survival as a valid outcome in examining the effects of founding 
environment (Audretsch & Mata, 1995; Geroski et al., 2010; Romanelli, 1989; Sarkar et al., 
2006). Finally, startup company survival is of importance to both managers and policy 
makers, especially those considering state innovation programs as a major regime shift of the 
entrepreneurial environment within the state.   
To measure new venture survival, the dependent variable is coded in two different 
ways based on the estimation method. In a probit model that tests the effect of a program 
on survival, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if a new venture has survived at least three 




(five) years after entry and is coded as 0 otherwise. For the survival analysis, the dependent 
variable, entrant exit, is coded as 1 if an entrant has exited in a given year and 0 otherwise. 
As noted in Table 3.4, about 19 percent of the establishments in this study exit after three 
years and approximately 32 percent after five years.  
3.3.3.3  Explanatory variables  
Program Indicator  
The key explanatory variable in this study is the cohort indicator: program. The 
variable program is coded as 1 if an entrant was founded within three years after the launch of 
a major program (i.e., these entrants belong to Post-launch Cohort), and is coded as 0 if an 
entrant was established within three years before a major program launch (i.e., these entrants 
belong to Pre-launch Cohort).   
To account for founding and time-varying effects, I also control for other entrant-
level, industry-level and macroeconomic-level variables that may affect post-entry 
performance  
Entrant-level variables  
Previous literature shows that the initial size and current size of new ventures are 
both responsible for the observed variation in post-entry performance for such ventures 
(Geroski et al., 2010). Consequently, the entrant-level controls in this study include both the 
initial size of the entrant at founding and the current size observed at the end of the 
observation period, or in the year that the entrant exited. Both of these variables are 
measured by the number of employees in the firm.   
Industry-level variables  




To capture market competition and industry dynamics, following prior literature 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Geroski et al., 2010; Sarkar et al., 2006; Swaminathan, 
1996), I construct several time-variant controls at the industry subsector level by state. First, 
I calculate industry concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for 
each industry subsector by state. In addition, I aggregate the establishment-level data to the 
industry subsector level and calculate the entry rate, exit rate, and relative density to measure the 
intensity of competition faced by the new venture. The entry (exit) rate is computed as the 
number of entrants (exits) in a year divided by the total number of firms that existed in the 
industry subsector in the preceding year for each state. I use 1-year lagged values rather than 
contemporaneous values for entry and exit rates to reduce the concerns of endogeneity of 
these two variables with the dependent variable. For each state, the relative density is 
computed by dividing the number of establishments in an industry subsector in a given year 
by the maximum number of establishments in this industry subsector from 1990 to 2009. 
The industry growth rate, as measured by the percentage change of total sales by industry 
subsector for each state over time, is constructed to control for sector fluctuation over time.  
Macroeconomic-level variables  
Although the industry growth rate can be used to capture the change of 
macroeconomic situation faced by a focal industry over time, as a robustness check, I also 
compute the state real GDP growth rate as a macroeconomic-level control variable.   
 Model specification and estimation  3.3.4
My identification strategy includes two important components.  I first divide the 
sample into two cohorts A and B, as described in the previous section. These cohorts mainly 
differ in their “founding environment” – whether or not entrants were founded during the 




existence of a major innovation program. After controlling for observable differences 
between these two cohorts, the founding environment should then be the main reason for 
any differences in survival patterns between the two cohorts.  
I further divide both cohorts into two subsamples: startup companies and new 
subsidiaries. I do so because startup companies and new subsidiaries in the same cohort may 
face similar unobservable factors over time that could affect survival but may be 
insufficiently captured by the controls. Since state innovation programs target startup 
companies rather than new subsidiaries, if I use the subsample of new subsidiaries as a 
benchmark and discern a significant effect of the state programs on startup companies rather 
than new subsidiaries in the same cohort, it would relieve my concern that the results are due 
to unobserved factors not attributable to these entrepreneurship-focused innovation 
programs.   
After narrowing the sample to those companies established before and after the 
major innovation program launch in each state, I use several different estimation methods to 
identify the program’s effect on new firm survival.  
First, I use traditional probit regressions to test whether a program has a significant 
effect on the new ventures’ probabilities of survival in the following three (five) years.  
Equation (1) represents my baseline model:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 = Φ(𝛼𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛿)                                         (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝑃(𝜆𝑖𝑡+1 = 1|𝑍𝑖𝑡) and t represents analysis time. Thus, the entrant is founded 
at t=0, and t+1 indicates a certain time period after the entrant was founded. Furthermore, 𝜆 
is the binary indicator that equals 1 if the entrant survives at least three (five) years, and equals 
0 otherwise. I use probit estimation with a robust standard error and report the marginal 
effects for ease of interpretation. In this estimation,  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖 is the cohort indicator that 




equals 1 if the entrant is founded during the existence of an active innovation and 0 otherwise. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of the entrant and industry-level control variables described in the 
previous section. I use the three- (five-) year growth rates of the specific industry subsector to 
control for different time trends faced by the two cohorts. I also include industry subsector 
and state fixed effects to control for any time-invariant differences across industry subsectors 
or states.  
Second, to examine the conditional exit probability of a new venture, I use the Cox 
proportional hazards model with right censoring. A similar procedure has been used in 
previous studies on firm survival (e.g., Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995; Disney, Haskel, & 
Heden, 2003; Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht, 2004; Wagner, 1994). In this model, the hazard 
rate represents the probability that a new venture will exit the industry within a particular 
time interval, conditional upon survival until that period. The effects of the explanatory 
variables are measured using the following model:  
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0exp (𝛼𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛿)                                                         (2)  
where ℎ0  is the baseline hazard rate.   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖  and 𝑋𝑖𝑡  are defined similarly as in the 
probit regression.  
There are several advantages to use this semi-parametric estimation model. The first 
is that the baseline hazard is given no particular parameterization and, in fact, can be left 
unestimated; the model makes no assumptions about the shape of the hazard over time. 
Second, compared to the probit model, it can include time-varying covariates and takes into 
account that the entrants may exit after the observation period. Therefore, the Cox model 
with right censoring can accommodate incomplete survival durations for entrants that cease 
to exist by the end of the sample period.  Furthermore, this estimation model enables me to 
study how the exit rates of new ventures change over time, and to study how such rates are 




affected by the presence of a state innovation program, while controlling for other industry- 
and entrant-level characteristics.  Finally, the Cox proportional hazards model includes time-
variant covariates that the program effect can differ linearly or non-linearly over time.  
To investigate whether the program effect changes over the observation period, I 
extend the Cox model and include an interaction term between “Program” and time trend 
“Time”, as indicated in Equation (3). If 𝛼2 is significantly different from 0, then the program 
effect may decay or increase over time.  
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0exp [𝛼1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛿]                  (3)  
Since my data are annual snapshots, the durations are grouped into yearly intervals. I 
use two versions of the Cox model based on the data structure. The first is the baseline 
setup in which each subject (i.e., new venture) has one observation. The second is a panel 
version in which I split the duration of each subject by year so that each subject has multiple 
observations over time. In the panel setup, I add time-variant industry-level characteristics to 
control for the overall industry variations. I also include an additional macroeconomic-level 
control to test the robustness of the results.  Robust standard errors are used to account for 
intra-firm nonindependence of observations.  
3.4 Results  
The key question in this study is whether state innovation programs alter the 
entrepreneurial founding environment, and in turn, affect the post-entry survival of startup 
companies. In addition, I am interested in understanding whether the existence of major 
state innovation programs during the startup stage of new ventures brings short-term or 
long-term effects and whether the effects differ by industry. To shed empirical light on these 
questions, I first conduct a non-parametric analysis without controls and plot the overall 




patterns of survival using Kaplan-Meier estimates. I then use the probit and Cox 
proportional hazard models to investigate the program effect while controlling for other 
entrant- and industry-level characteristics.  
Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics for the full sample.  Panel A shows the 
summary statistics for all variables used in the baseline regressions. Panel B presents the 
summary statistics for variables after splitting the full sample into yearly time-intervals in 
which each entrant has multiple observations over time. Table 3.5 displays correlation of 
each of the variables described in the prior section. The key independent variable (Program) 
has very low correlation with other control variables (all lower than 0.14). Although there is 
high correlation between initial and current size of entrants (0.86 and 0.84 in two samples 
respectively), I run additional estimations (available upon request) without one of the size 
controls, and all main results do not change.  
 Patterns of survival  3.4.1
Figure 3.3 plots the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, which suggest 
the probability of survival past time t without controls.  Figure 3.3a indicates that the cohort 
of new ventures established before the launch of a major innovation program (Pre-launch 
Cohort) experience similar survival patterns over time as the cohort of new ventures 
established after the major program launch (Post-launch Cohort). However, for each time 
interval, Post-launch Cohort exhibits a slightly higher probability of survival than Pre-launch 
Cohort, with this difference decreasing over time. Figures 3.3b and 3.3c provide the 
estimates when I divide the sample into two subsamples: startups and new subsidiaries. 
Figure 3.3b shows that, in the short-term, startup companies founded when there is an active 
state program have a higher probability of survival than startups founded when there is no 




active program. This difference is less pronounced in the long-run. For new subsidiaries, 
Figure 3.3c shows that there is no clear pattern regarding whether Pre-launch Cohort or 
Post-launch Cohort is more likely to survive. Instead, survival probability depends on the 
analysis time and time interval.   
 Long-term vs. short-term effects   3.4.2
Figure 3.3 provides an overview of how the respective survival probabilities of the 
two focal cohorts evolve over time. However, since other founding and current conditions 
may also affect subsequent survival probability, I use parametric and semi-parametric 
regression models to isolate the program effect, while controlling for other factors that may 
affect survival. Using these models, I examine both long-term and short-term effects.   
Table 3.6 presents the results from the probit regression model. The dependent 
variable is a binary indicator of whether the entrant is still in business after three (five) years. 
Columns (1) and (4) present the baseline results without controls. These results are robust 
after entrant-level and industry-level controls are added to the baseline regression. Overall, 
entrants established when there is an active program are more likely to survive than those 
established before the program was initiated.   
Table 3.7 presents the results by startups versus new subsidiaries. These results 
show that program effect is still quite robust with or without entrant-level and industry-
level controls. Specifically, columns (1)-(6) show that startups founded after the launch of a 
major state program are 7.0 percent more likely to survive in the next three years and 6.9 
percent more likely to survive in the next five years. The program effect on survival does 
not hold for new subsidiaries and I do not find any significant program effect in any of the 
cases presented in Columns (7)-(12). If some unobservable factors other than the state 




programs make the entrants in Post-launch Cohort more likely to survive than those in Pre-
launch Cohort, we would expect new subsidiaries in Post-launch Cohort to also be affected 
by these factors. The significant difference of survival probability between startup 
companies in Pre-launch and Post-launch Cohorts and the insignificant difference between 
new subsidiaries in Pre-launch and Post-launch Cohorts suggest that the entrepreneurial 
founding environment potentially altered by state innovation programs may be the main 
explanation for the different survival patterns of new ventures. Thus, both the non-
parametric estimates (Figure 3.3) and baseline regression results (Table 3.7) support 
Hypothesis 1.   
The results in Table 3.7 also show that, although startups in Post-launch Cohort are 
more likely to survive than startups in Pre-launch Cohort, both the magnitude and 
significance of the difference decreases in the long-run. To get a clearer idea of whether 
innovation programs have a time-variant effect, I use the Cox proportional hazard model to 
better address right censoring and to test the program effect over a longer time period.    
Table 3.8 presents the results from the Cox proportional hazards model. Columns 
(1) and (2) show the baseline results for startups, based on Equation (2).  Note that, 
although built on different model assumptions, the estimation results are quite consistent 
with those from the baseline probit regressions. Overall, the findings indicate that the 
cohort of new ventures established during an active state program faces a lower hazard rate 
of 9.8 percent (=1-exp(-0.103)), compared to those established without an active state 
program. These results suggest that entrepreneurial resources provided by state programs 
improve founding environment for startup companies, and in turn, make those companies 
less likely to exit. By contract, the results for new subsidiaries indicate no differences based 
on the presence of an innovation program.  




One potential disadvantage of the basic Cox model with one observation per 
subject is that it assumes that all control variables are time-invariant. To address this issue, I 
use the panel version of the Cox model and split the time interval by year, providing annual 
observations for each entrant from entry through exit. This panel version includes time-
variant covariates that may affect post-entry survival. The regression results, presented in 
Table 3.9 yield findings consistent with those from the basic Cox model.  
Overall, the results in Table 3.9 indicate that startup companies in Post-launch 
Cohort have lower hazard rates (hazard=exit) than those in Pre-launch Cohort, and the 
magnitude of this program effect increases when industry-level controls are made time-
variant. Specifically, the estimation suggests that startup companies in Post-launch Cohort 
face a lower hazard rate of 25 percent (1-exp(-0.288)) after I  include state-level 
macroeconomic trends, as measured by state real GDP growth, to alleviate the concern that 
macroeconomic fluctuation (e.g., the economic recession) may affect the two cohorts 
differently.  
To test whether the program effect is time variant in the long-run, I estimate 
Equation (3) including an interaction term between analysis time T and the key variable 
Program. The results in Column (3) in Table 3.9 show that the program effect decays 
significantly over time. For example, one year after being founded, startup companies in 
Post-launch Cohort have a 45 percent lower hazard rate than startups in Pre-launch Cohort, 
while after five years, the difference in hazard rates becomes 15 percent. In other words, 
although the presence of an innovation program when startup companies are founded is 
associated with greater firm survival rates, this overall effect decays over time. Hence, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported.  




This decay of program effect over time may have two reasons. First, at least for 
some startup companies in Post-launch Cohort, state innovation programs only alleviate 
their liquidity constraint at their founding stages rather than helping them bridge the valley 
of death. These companies have lower hazard rates in their initial years, but are actually 
more likely to exit after a certain period of time, decreasing the long-term program effect on 
firm survival. Second, an indirect effect of these state programs is to entice marginal 
entrants that are less promising. As a consequence, Post-launch Cohort may include higher 
proportion of less promising entrepreneurial-firms. These companies may rely on less 
mature technology or target a market with greater uncertainty. The exit of these less 
promising companies after certain period of time may thus increase the average hazard rates 
of Post-launch Cohort compared to Pre-launch Cohort.   
 Heterogeneous effects on biopharmaceutical vs. medical device startups 3.4.3
Biopharmaceutical companies and medical device companies differ in terms of the 
resources required for commercialization. In particular, biopharmaceutical startup companies 
require more capital and other commercialization resources and may face a deeper “valley of 
death” at their founding stage. The results in Column (4) of Table 3.9 show that the 
difference in hazard rates between Post-launch and Pre-launch Cohorts is more pronounced 
for biopharmaceutical companies than for medical device companies.  
By contract, I find no significant program effect on new subsidiaries. This finding 
reinforces the argument that a causal relationship between program existence and post-entry 
survival can be inferred from these results with robust program effects on startups.  
To further investigate program effects on biopharmaceutical versus medical device 
startup companies, I conduct sub-sample analysis. The results in Table 3.10 reconfirm my 




observation based on Table 3.9 and indicate that the program effect on biopharmaceutical 
companies is bigger than that on medical device companies. Interestingly, I also find that the 
program effect only decays significantly over time on the subsample of medical device 
companies. These findings support my Hypothesis 3 and suggest heterogeneous program 
effects on different industry subsectors with different levels of resource requirement for 
commercialization.  
 Other findings and robustness checks  3.4.4
The control variables also offer some interesting findings. As shown in Table 3.7 
and Table 3.8, I consistently find that the lagged exit rates at founding in the entrants’ 
industry sector increase the new ventures’ probability of survival. The results in Table 3.9 
show that the time-variant exit rate has even larger effects. In other words, when more 
firms exit from the market, the startup has a higher probability of survival. As presented in 
Table 3.9, the time-variant relative density of the focal industry subsector has a significantly 
positive effect on startups’ hazard rates, so startups located in a state and industry subsector 
with higher density have a lower survival probability. As expected, positive industry growth 
in a focal state reduces the hazard rates for startup companies.  
 To further examine the sensitivity of my results, I conducted several robustness 
checks. The results are presented in Table 3.11. For example, one concern that might arise in 
interpreting the results is that firms with good technologies may postpone founding if a 
program is anticipated, in the hopes of receiving program benefits. To test whether this 
potential self-selection problem affects my results, I limit the sample by excluding new 
ventures established in the program launch year or in the prior year. Re-estimating the main 
results with this refined sample does not change my main findings, as shown in Panel A. 




Second, as a falsification test, I assume the program launch year in each state to be the year 
three years before the actual launch year. In this case, both Pre-launch and Post-launch 
Cohort companies are founded before the actual program launch year. The results in panel B 
show that these cohorts do not show any difference in their survival rates in either the short 
or long term. These results provide additional evidence for the robustness of my previous 
results.   
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion   
This study investigates the extent to which major state innovation programs designed 
to  shape the entrepreneurial founding environment for startup companies affect new 
ventures’ post-entry survival patterns. To address this question, I compile historical 
innovation program information for a group of states in the Great Lakes region and focus 
my analysis on the effects of state programs on two important sectors – biopharmaceutical 
and medical device –within the life sciences industry. To identify the causal effect of state 
programs on new venture survival, I create two cohorts for each state. Pre-launch Cohort 
includes entrants that were founded within three years before a major program launch and 
Post-launch Cohort includes entrants founded within three years after a major program 
launch. The main difference between these two cohorts is their founding environment. I also 
divide all entrants into startup companies and new subsidiaries, as state innovation programs 
are expected to have a more pronounced effect on startups than on new subsidiaries 
established by existing companies. I use multiple methods to examine the overall, long-term, 
and short-term program effects and also to investigate potential heterogeneous program 
effects on biopharmaceutical versus medical device startups.  




The results provide compelling and robust evidence that startups founded when a 
major state program exists are more likely to survive than those established without a 
program in place at their founding stage. This finding holds after I control for observable 
entrant-level and industry-level covariates identified in prior studies (Disney et al., 2003; 
Geroski, 1995; Geroski et al., 2010; Mata et al., 1995; Sarkar et al., 2006; Swaminathan, 1996).  
In addition, my results based on a semi-parametric survival analysis show that the 
effect of major innovation programs on firm survival diminishes over time. Although Post-
launch Cohort companies founded in the presence of an active innovation program face 
lower hazard rates in their initial years compared to those founded without an innovation 
program in place, the difference in survival probability between the two cohorts is less 
pronounced in the long-run. 
As expected, my results also show that the program effect is more pronounced for 
pharmaceutical startup companies, which have higher resource requirements for 
commercialization, than for medical device companies. For medical device startup 
companies, the evidence suggests that higher proportion of less promising companies are 
established after the program launch, and these startups show higher exit rates in the long 
run.  
Finally, my results show no effect of state innovation programs on either the short- 
or long-term survival rate for new subsidiaries.  This lack of effect for subsidiaries suggests 
that the results are not impacted by some common industry or macroeconomic trends that 
may make Post-launch Cohort startups more likely to survive than those in prior-launch Pre-
launch Cohort.     
The evidence from this study suggests that at least for some startup companies, the 
state innovation programs only solve their immediate liquidity constraint rather than helping 




them bridge the valley of death at their founding stage. At the same time, the innovation 
program may also entice some less promising startups that reveal higher hazard rates after 
certain period of time, especially in industries with lower resource requirement for 
commercialization 
Overall, this study represents an important first step in providing empirical evidence 
for the effects of state innovation programs on new ventures. It also builds a natural stage 
for further research. Specifically, this study treats a major program launch as a regime shift in 
the entrepreneurial founding environment. Future research could explore the effects of 
different program components by probing more deeply into how the specific design of 
entrepreneurial programs impacts their effects on entrepreneurial firms. Understanding the 
pros and cons of various program mechanisms and their performance implications for 
entrepreneurial firms remains a fruitful avenue for further investigation.  
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Figure 3.1 Timing of Major Program Launches 
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Table 3.1 State Innovation Programs in Four Great Lakes States, 1990-2009 
 
  





Initial Budget Announced 
($M) 
IL * IL VentureTECH 2000 2005 1900 
  
Technology Development Account (fund of funds) 2004 ongoing 50 
  
State Supported Stem Cell Research 2007 2012 100 
      IN 
 
21st Century Research & Technology Fund 1999 ongoing 50 
  
Indiana Genomics Initiative (INGEN) 2000 ongoing 105 
 
* BioCrossRoads (Central Indiana Life Sciences Initiative) 2002 ongoing 1500 
  
Life Sciences R&D Growth Fund 2008 2009 20 
  
Indiana Innovation Alliance 2009 ongoing 20 
      
MI * 
Michigan Life Science Corridor (Michigan Technology Tri-
corridor after 2004) 1999 2005 1000 
  
Smart Zones  2001 ongoing 50 
 
* The 21st Century Job Fund 2006 ongoing 2000 
  
Venture Michigan Fund I 2006 ongoing 95 
  
Invest Michigan! Fund 2008 ongoing 300 
      OH 
 
Ohio Technology Investment Tax Credit  1996 ongoing 45 
 
* Ohio Third Frontier 2002 ongoing 1600 
  
Ohio Capital Fund/Ohio Venture Capital Authority   2003 ongoing 150 
Notes:  
1. This table lists state innovation programs identified with initial budgets of $20 million or more.  




















Industry Sectors  NAICS Codes (2002) 
I. BIOPHARMACEUTICALS  
     Medicinal and botanical manufacturing  325411 
    Biopharmaceutical preparation manufacturing  325412 
    In-vitro diagnostic substance manufacturing  325413 
    Other biological product manufacturing  325414 
II. MEDICAL DEVICES                                                                                                           
(Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments)  
     Electromedical apparatus manufacturing  334510 
    Analytical laboratory instrument manufacturing  334516 
    Irradiation apparatus manufacturing  334517 
III. MEDICAL DEVICES                                                                                                              
(Medical Equipment and Suppliers) 
 
 
    Laboratory apparatus and furniture manufacturing  339111 
    Surgical and medical instrument manufacturing  339112 
    Surgical appliance and supplies manufacturing  339113 
    Dental equipment and supplies manufacturing  339114 
    Ophthalmic goods manufacturing  339115 



















    Full Sample  
  
# of Entrants  % # of Startups  % 
Pre-launch Cohort  
 
761 48.91 573 46.74 
Post-launch Cohort 
 




# of Entrants  % # of Startups  % 
Pre-launch Cohort  
 
235 45.9 171 43.62 
Post-launch Cohort 
 




# of Entrants  % # of Startups  % 
Pre-launch Cohort  
 
91 51.12 66 49.62 
Post-launch Cohort 
 




# of Entrants  % # of Startups  % 
Pre-launch Cohort  
 
183 46.92 153 46.79 
Post-launch Cohort 
 




# of Entrants  % # of Startups  % 
Pre-launch Cohort  
 
252 52.94 183 48.93 
Post-launch Cohort 
 
224 47.06 191 51.07 
Notes: Pre-launch Cohort  = entrants founded within 3 years before a major program launch 




















Panel A: Variables in Probit and  Cox regressions (one observation per entrant) (N=1555) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Entrant-level  
    Survival after 3 years  0.81 0.39 0 1 
Survival after 5 years 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Program (0=Pre-launch Cohort; 1=Post-launch Cohort) 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Initial number of employees (10s) 2.26 18.29 0.10 600.00 
Current number of employees (10s) 2.62 21.11 0.10 600.00 
Industry-level  
    Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) at founding 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.58 
Entry rate at founding (1-year lagged) 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.20 
Exit rate at founding (1-year lagged) 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.15 
Relative density at founding  0.83 0.11 0.43 0.93 
Industry growth at founding  0.03 0.14 -0.40 0.49 
 Panel B:  Variables in Cox regressions panel version (multiple observations per entrant) (N=10356)  
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Entrant-level  
    Program (0=Pre-launch Cohort; 1=Post-launch Cohort) 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Initial number of employees (10s) 2.51 20.41 0.10 600.00 
Current number of employees (10s) 3.22 24.86 0.10 600.00 
Industry-level  
    Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)  0.10 0.09 0.01 0.58 
Entry rate  (1-year lagged) 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.20 
Exit rate (1-year lagged) 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.20 
Relative density  0.88 0.10 0.43 1.00 
Industry Growth  0.00 0.13 -0.69 0.73 
Macroeconomic-level  





Table 3.5 Correlations of Variables 
Panel A: Variables in Probit and  Cox regressions (one observation per entrant) (N=1555) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Survival after 3 years  1 
         (2) survival after 5 years 0.706 1 
        (3) Program (0=Pre-launch Cohort; 1=Post-launch Cohort) 0.061 0.059 1 
       (4) Initial number of employees (10s) 0.012 0.030 0.025 1 
      (5) Current number of employees (10s) 0.025 0.043 -0.005 0.859 1 
     (6) Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) at founding 0.037 0.061 0.011 0.064 0.077 1 
    (7) Entry rate at founding (1-year lagged) 0.005 0.010 -0.024 0.047 0.031 0.530 1 
   (8) Exit rate at founding (1-year lagged) 0.029 0.053 0.002 0.066 0.038 0.259 0.278 1 
  (9) Relative density at founding  -0.026 -0.072 0.064 -0.086 -0.105 -0.616 -0.527 -0.175 1 
 (10) Industry growth at founding  0.001 0.029 -0.199 0.099 0.083 -0.129 -0.280 -0.142 0.059 1 
Panel B:  Variables in Cox regressions panel version (multiple observations per entrant) (N=10356)  
  
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
 (11) Program (0=Pre-launch Cohort; 1=Post-launch Cohort) 1 
         (12) Initial number of employees (10s) 0.022 1 
        (13) Current number of employees (10s) -0.015 0.840 1 
       (14) Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)  0.047 0.076 0.091 1 
      (15) Entry rate  (1-year lagged) 0.012 0.063 0.073 0.511 1 
     (16) Exit rate (1-year lagged) -0.016 0.012 0.015 0.235 0.103 1 
    (17) Relative density  0.103 -0.052 -0.072 -0.357 -0.336 -0.216 1 
   (18) Industry growth  -0.045 0.013 0.015 -0.064 -0.151 -0.019 -0.105 1 






Table 3.6 Probit Regressions on Survival (Sample = All Entrants) 
  Survival after 3 years   Survival after 5 years 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Program (0=Pre-launch Cohort; 1=Post-launch Cohort) 0.048** 0.050** 0.053** 
 
0.055** 0.055** 0.070*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Entrant-level Controls 









Current size (current # of employees) 
  
0.003* 
   
0.005** 
   
(0.002) 
   
(0.003) 
Industry-level Controls 
       Industry concentration (HHI) at founding  
  
-0.035 
   
0.006 
   
(0.211) 
   
(0.251) 
Entry rate at founding (1-year lagged) 
  
-0.447 
   
-0.857 
   
(0.512) 
   
(0.615) 
Exit rate at founding (1-year lagged) 
  
0.669 
   
1.389** 
   
(0.562) 
   
(0.696) 
Relative density at founding  
  
-0.076 
   
-0.396 
   
(0.219) 
   
(0.268) 
Industry growth (measured by sales growth) 
  
0.016 
   
0.137 
   
(0.075) 
   
(0.094) 
Subsector dummies  No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
State dummies  No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -755.4 -749.6 -746.6 
 
-973.9 -961.8 -953.3 
Observations 1,555 1,555 1,555   1,555 1,555 1,555 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Notes: 1. The unit of employment is 10s  
           2. Marginal effects are reported 





Table 3.7 Probit Regressions on Survival (Startup Companies vs. New Subsidiaries) 
  Startup Companies     New Subsidiaries 
VARIABLES Survival after 3 years Survival after 5 years 
 
Survival after 3 years Survival after 5 years 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Program (0=Pre-launch Cohort;  0.070*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.062** 0.056** 0.069** 
 
-0.027 -0.028 -0.060 0.030 0.021 0.006 
               1=Post-launch Cohort) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.049) (0.052) (0.053) (0.058) 
Entrant-level Controls 
























































































































Subsector dummies  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State dummies  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -600.1 -591.2 -586.7 -767.1 -744.1 -730.9 
 
-153.0 -149.8 -147.4 -206.6 -200.9 -198.1 
Observations 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226   329 329 329 329 329 329 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
             Notes: 1. The unit of employment is 10s  






Table 3.8 Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions (Baseline Results) 
  Startup Companies   New Subsidiaries  
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 































































Industry growth at founding  -0.370** 0.141 
  (0.164)   (0.199) 
Subsector dummies  Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
State dummies  Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
log-likelihood -4349 -4333 
 
-1061 -1059 
Observations 1,226 1,226   329 329 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






Table 3.9 Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions (with Time-variant Covariates) 
  Startup Companies    New Subsidiaries  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Program (0=Pre-launch Cohort; 1=Post-launch Cohort) -0.288*** -0.597*** -0.207** 
 
-0.243 -0.215 -0.184 
 
(0.090) (0.142) (0.093) 
 
(0.177) (0.320) (0.211) 
Program* Analysis Time (_t) 
 
0.086*** 





   
(0.066) 
 Program * Pharmaceutical (Y/N) 
  
-0.774*** 
   
-0.152 
   
(0.235) 
   
(0.292) 
Entrant-level Controls 
       Initial size (initial # of employees) 0.058 0.058 0.056 
 
0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Current size (current # of employees) -0.150** -0.150** -0.151** 
 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.061) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Industry-level Controls 
       Industry concentration (HHI)  1.409 1.223 1.818** 
 
0.165 0.166 0.265 
 
(0.865) (0.864) (0.856) 
 
(1.373) (1.375) (1.383) 
Entry rate (1-year lagged) -4.219** -4.107** -4.405** 
 
-0.595 -0.600 -0.606 
 
(1.879) (1.888) (1.887) 
 
(2.160) (2.161) (2.168) 
Exit rate (1-year lagged) -11.534*** -12.155*** -11.688*** 
 
-10.426*** -10.395*** -10.451*** 
 
(1.595) (1.596) (1.609) 
 
(2.388) (2.443) (2.391) 
Relative density  3.595*** 3.103*** 3.991*** 
 
-0.058 -0.047 -0.015 
 
(0.780) (0.769) (0.786) 
 
(1.078) (1.082) (1.090) 
Industry growth  -0.710** -0.770*** -0.685** 
 
-0.774 -0.768 -0.763 
 
(0.290) (0.289) (0.290) 
 
(0.533) (0.541) (0.534) 
Macroeconomic-level Control 
       GSP growth  -2.919 -2.358 -2.951 
 
-0.272 -0.323 -0.278 
 
(2.001) (1.989) (2.003) 
 
(3.666) (3.647) (3.669) 
Subsector dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
log-likelihood -4300 -4296 -4295 
 
-1052 -1052 -1052 
Observations 8,189 8,189 8,189   2,167 2,167 2,167 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Table 3.10 Subsample Analysis – Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions (with Time-variant Covariates) 
  Biopharmaceuticals    Medical Devices  
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 











































































State dummies  Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
log-likelihood -388.8 -388.8 
 
-3646 -3643 
Observations 1,262 1,262   6,927 6,927 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: 1. Unit of employment = 10s 





















  Panel A   Panel B 
 
Refined Sample  
 
Falsification Test  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Program (0=Pre-launch Cohort ; 1=Post-launch Cohort ) -0.557*** -0.992*** -0.464*** 
 
-0.106 -0.169 -0.075 
 
(0.121) (0.185) (0.126) 
 
(0.078) (0.127) (0.082) 
Program* Analysis Time (_t) 
 
0.130*** 





   
(0.023) 
 Program * Biopharmaceutical (Y/N) 
  
-1.143*** 
   
-0.233 
   
(0.284) 
   
(0.202) 
Entrant-level Controls 
       Initial size (initial # of employees) -0.071 -0.068 -0.074 
 
0.047 0.047 0.049 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.072) 
 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
Current size (current # of employees) -0.213** -0.215** -0.208** 
 
-0.101* -0.101* -0.102* 
 
(0.094) (0.093) (0.091) 
 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Industry-level Controls 
       Industry concentration (HHI)  0.675 0.316 1.509 
 
-0.069 -0.050 -0.030 
 
(1.066) (1.062) (1.026) 
 
(0.780) (0.779) (0.785) 
Entry rate (1-year lagged) -4.314* -3.947 -4.635* 
 
-1.967 -2.019 -2.030 
 
(2.407) (2.423) (2.443) 
 
(1.474) (1.466) (1.464) 
Exit rate (1-year lagged) -14.475*** -15.352*** -14.662*** 
 
-7.135*** -7.194*** -6.972*** 
 
(2.097) (2.053) (2.132) 
 
(1.394) (1.407) (1.387) 
Relative density  3.850*** 2.850*** 4.698*** 
 
3.268*** 3.222*** 3.384*** 
 
(1.006) (0.998) (1.023) 
 
(0.545) (0.544) (0.553) 
Industry growth  -1.172*** -1.263*** -1.144*** 
 
-0.637** -0.643** -0.633** 
 
(0.398) (0.394) (0.400) 
 
(0.288) (0.289) (0.289) 
Macroeconomic-level Control 
       GSP growth  -7.421*** -6.996*** -7.494*** 
 
-2.168 -2.116 -2.173 
 
(2.436) (2.444) (2.423) 
 
(1.677) (1.672) (1.680) 
Subsector dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
log-likelihood -2719 -2714 -2712 
 
-5146 -5146 -5146 
Observations 5,413 5,413 5,413   9,993 9,993 9,993 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





CHAPTER 4  
STAYING LOCAL OR MOVING AWAY?  
RELOCATION DECISIONS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS AND THE 
IMPACT OF STATE INNOVATION PROGRAMS  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Research has shown that the geographic location of a firm can impact its 
performance. Motivated by Marshall’s seminal work (1920), scholars have investigated 
numerous environmental, industrial and organizational factors that affect the geographic 
location decisions of firms (e.g., Alcacer, 2006; Alcacer & Chung, 2010; Audretsch, Lehmann, 
& Warning, 2005; Shaver, 1998). Despite compelling evidence of a “home sweet home” bias 
(Dahl & Sorenson, 2012), anecdotes of business relocations are plentiful. Consider, for 
example, BlueWare, an information technology company from northern Michigan. When 
CEO Rose Harr decided to expand and hire an additional 190 workers, she moved the 
company to Florida, leaving behind close family and business contacts (Lovy, 2012) 
The decision to “stay local” can pose difficult trade-offs for entrepreneurial firms, 
particularly in sectors that require external financing and support during the 
commercialization process. Prior research suggests that staying local allows entrepreneurs to 
leverage interpersonal networks and existing organizational ties (e.g., with universities or 
other research institutions) while avoiding the disruptions and costs of relocation (Dahl & 





to secure expansion capital, management talent or business services, thus limiting the upside 
potential of these ventures (Chen, Gompers, Kovner, & Lerner, 2010; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, 
& Lu, 2007; Porter & Stern, 2001). Perhaps due to the difficulty of tracking cross-state 
movement by entrepreneurial firms with Census data, empirical evidence on the relocations 
of new science and technology companies is sparse.  
Little also is known about the effects, if any, of state innovation programs aimed at 
stimulating entrepreneurship in science and technology industries and, in turn, building more 
robust clusters of innovative activity within the state.  Since the mid-1980s, numerous states 
have pursued “economic gardening strategies” to support local entrepreneurial activity. As 
discussed in the earlier chapters, the Michigan Life Sciences Corridor (MLSC), for example, 
emerged from the state’s $1 billion legal settlement with the tobacco industry in 1999. 
Prominent among technology-based economic development programs, the MLSC initiative 
is credited with making Michigan one of the fastest-growing U.S. states in the life sciences 
sector (MEDC, 2010). In 2002, the state of Ohio launched a similar Ohio Third Frontier 
(OTF) Program, which has grown to a $2.3 billion endeavor. According to OTF reports, the 
program has supported the creation and financing of over 571 Ohio-based companies since 
2005 (SRI, 2009).  
If these public initiatives help develop a stronger infrastructure of entrepreneurial 
resources, the relative disadvantage of staying local should decline over time and reduce the 
likelihood that promising companies will relocate to more resource-rich locations. As Lerner 
(2009) and others report, however, there is valid skepticism of public efforts to support 
entrepreneurial activity:  such programs are notoriously difficult to design and run. The null 
hypothesis—that state programs will fail to alter entrepreneurial-firm relocation decisions—





To contribute to our understanding of the relation between state innovation 
programs and firm relocation decisions, this study examines the relocation decisions of more 
than forty thousand life sciences and information technology companies initially located in 
five Great Lakes states: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, from the period of 
1990 to 2010. In this study, relocation decisions are identified as events indicated in the Dun 
and Bradstreet database that signal departures due to standalone firm decisions as well as 
relocations driven by corporate takeover (M&A) activity by firms in other states.  Since this 
database includes information compiled from multiple sources, I am able to follow each 
startup and its location before and after the creation of state incentive programs.   
To conduct my analysis, I use a competing risks model to identify the cumulative 
incidence function of relocation and then examine the impact of state innovation programs 
on the subhazard of relocation (after treating firm closure as a competing risk). Overall, my 
results show that high technology companies in the life sciences sector in the Great Lakes 
region are more likely to move away from their home states than are companies in the 
information technology industry.  In addition, I find that growing companies are more likely 
to depart than are non-growing companies. These results suggest that firms with higher 
requirements for external resources face higher hazard rates of outmigration.1  
To examine the impact of state innovation programs on firm relocation decision, I 
also exploit time-varying differences across Great Lakes states in the launch of major 
entrepreneurial programs. Major programs are defined as those with either an initial budget 
or committed funding of more than $1 billion. To compare the hazard of relocation before 
and after a major program launch, I construct two program event windows – a short 6-year 
event window and a longer 10-year event window. Doing so, I find a consistent and 
                                                 





significant decrease in the relocation hazard for young firms. This evidence suggests that 
state initiatives may bolster the retention of entrepreneurial firms, with more pronounced 
effects occurring in the longer event window.   
In a final set of analyses, I restrict attention to the subset of programs that target 
firms in the life sciences, and apply a difference-in-differences framework. This approach 
allows me to compare the extent to which relocations in targeted versus non-targeted sectors 
are affected by the existence of a state innovation program. The results provide consistent 
evidence that such programs reduce the likelihood of entrepreneurial firm relocations more 
dramatically within the sector targeted by an innovation program.  
Overall, my results contribute to the nascent literature on entrepreneurial location 
decisions and the public policies that affect such decisions. Specifically, this study extends 
work on economic geography and industry agglomeration by introducing a dynamic view of 
firm location decisions. Although previous studies have identified institutional, industrial and 
firm-level factors that may affect firm location decisions (Alcacer & Chung, 2007; Head, Ries, 
& Swenson, 1995; Stuart & Sorenson, 2003b), little is known about the proclivity of new 
science and technology companies in particular to relocate to another state once they have 
been established.  
Furthermore, this study extends previous literature by focusing on state innovation 
programs in a region outside traditional national hubs of entrepreneurial activity.  By 
focusing on the Great Lakes region, I am able to provide a more complete picture of how 
firms develop and migrate across a broader portion of the United States.  Finally, this study 
contributes to the literature on institutional changes and their impact on entrepreneurial 
development. While prior studies have shown how institutional and policy reforms affect the 





Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), little is known about the effect of such reforms on the 
geographic location choices of new ventures. In sum, this study provides new evidence of 
interest not only to scholars, but also to managers, investors, and policymakers involved in 
the creation and implementation of technology-based economic development programs 
(Lerner, 2009, 2010; Porter, 2000).  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the 
literature and prior empirical evidence related to the geographic location decisions of 
companies. In Section 3, I describe the empirical approach and describe the context, data, 
sample and empirical methods. In Section 4, I report my findings, including descriptive 
statistics and regression results. Finally, in Section 5, I summarize the results and discuss 
opportunities for future research.  
4.2  Related Literature and Prior Empirical Work  
In analyzing the effects of state innovation programs on entrepreneurial location 
decisions, this study builds on prior research on the more general determinants of location 
choices of firms, an issue that is examined extensively in the international business and 
industry agglomeration literature (e.g., Alcacer & Chung, 2007; Wheeler & Mody, 1992). In a 
classic framework, Marshall (1920) identifies three mechanisms that entice firms to locate 
within close geographic proximity to one another: labor market pooling, the presence of 
specialized suppliers, and knowledge spillover. Prior studies provide evidence for all three 
agglomeration forces (Ellison & Glaeser, 1999; Jofre-Monseny, Marín-López, & Viladecans-
Marsal, 2011). More recently, Shaver (2000) extends Marshall’s framework by arguing that 
the positive externalities (e.g., uncompensated knowledge flows) associated with industrial 





firms benefit from co-locating, those with superior technologies, capabilities, or know-how 
may locate away from other firms to better safeguard their competitive advantages.  This 
framework suggests that, while positive externalities may compel some firms to locate in 
clusters (Chung & Kalnins, 2001), the risk of losing proprietary information and human 
talent to rivals may lead others to remain distant (Shaver & Flyer, 2000).  
Recent studies regarding entrepreneurial location decisions build on the work of 
Marshall, extending it to the field of entrepreneurship to examine patterns in the initial 
location choices of startup companies. These studies also draw on the work of other 
researchers who have identified a number of mechanisms affecting the location decisions of 
new ventures, such as the presence of small suppliers, an abundant pool of workers (e.g., 
Glaeser and Kerr, 2009), funding opportunities (e.g., Chen et al., 2010), or social and 
professional networks (e.g, Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). 
Studies of science and technology startups further document that such firms benefit 
from close proximity to relevant research institutes and universities that can provide 
knowledge spillover (Audretsch et al., 2005; Buenstorf & Geissler, 2011).  Indeed, 
biotechnology startups have been shown to benefit from access to star faculty at nearby 
academic institutions (Zucker, Darby and Brewer, (1998).  
Finally, previous studies find that the regional benefits of proximity occur at the state 
border level.  That is, state borders have independent effects on knowledge diffusion 
(Belenzon & Schankerman, 2012; Singh, Marx, & Fleming, 2010). This evidence implies that 
firms located in the same state as related universities, research labs, hospitals and other 






 This strand of research yields insight into how entrepreneurs select the initial 
location of their companies.  However, it leaves two issues unaddressed in how such 
decisions are made. First, R&D resources are just one factor in determining where to locate.  
Depending on a startup’s stage of development, the firm may find it difficult to secure 
capital and talent to bring their innovative products and services to the market, and may 
consider moving to a new location. A second unresolved question in understanding 
entrepreneur location decisions is whether a firm chooses to remain in its initial location 
over time.  Since most location determination studies rely on cross-sectional data, assessing 
location choices at a specific time point, they are unable to inform the extent to which firms 
may change their primary locations over time. 
 Relocation decisions: the trade-offs between staying local and moving away  4.2.1
As discussed above, entrepreneurship has a surprisingly local flavor in that 
entrepreneurs tend to disproportionately found firms in the cities and states in which they 
currently reside (Chatterji, Glaeser, & Kerr, 2013). Existing studies tend to argue that 
entrepreneurs are more likely to stay local due to “regional embeddedness.” University 
spinoffs usually locate near their research facilities, and spin-out firms tend to take root near 
their parent companies (Klepper & Sleeper, 2005; Saxenian, 1996). 
This home bias stems from multiple factors, including family ties, access to 
established social capital, and the avoidance of relocation costs. In their study, Figueiredo, 
Guimaraes and Woodward (2002) quantify the home bias, finding that entrepreneurs are 
more willing to accept over three times higher labor costs to compete in their resident areas 
of business. Michelacci and Silva (2007) document the benefits of staying local; firms created 
by locals are bigger, operate with more capital-intensive technologies, and obtain greater 





evidence that entrepreneurs tend to locate in regions in which they have deep roots. Overall, 
this strand of research shows that individuals start companies in the location where they 
have formed business networks and have access to resources (Feldman & Francis, 2004).  
While entrepreneurs may find initial benefits in locating in their home states, these 
entrepreneurs may subsequently face strong pressure to relocate as they seek to build their 
companies and commercialize their products. A recent study by Berchicci, King, and Tucci 
(2011), for example, documents that many spinoffs end up moving to more remote 
geographic areas as they develop. Two main reasons are documented for such departures. 
First, as discussed, some firms move to better safeguard their technologies and assets from 
rivals (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). Romo and Schwartz (1995) argue, however, that such 
departures arise only when the viability of the firm is threatened. Second, firms may move in 
hopes of garnering access to the resources required for growth and expansion, such as the 
financial capital and services provided by VCs and incumbent firms. Indeed, Stuart and 
Sorenson (2003a) argue that the local conditions that promote the initial establishment of 
new companies can differ substantially from those needed for the successful expansion and 
development of those companies. The findings of this study suggest that although founders 
may be able to leverage relationships and social networks to mobilize resources to create a 
new firm by staying local, these firms may not perform well in the long run.   
Moreover, Kenney and Patton (2005) show evidence that biotechnology and its 
support network do not exhibit as great a clustering as do semiconductors and 
telecommunications equipment and their support networks. Although scholars agree that 
high technology industries are based on particular knowledge bases, but few studies 
investigate how the knowledge bases and entrepreneurial resources may impact spatial 





In sum, staying local may enable entrepreneurs to better leverage existing 
organizational ties and social contacts while avoiding the disruption and cost of relocation 
(Dahl & Sorenson, 2012; Feldman, 2004). However, as a firm grows, staying local may 
impede that same firm from obtaining the resources needed to commercialize its products 
(Chen et al., 2010; Porter & Stern, 2001), and the trade-offs of staying local and moving away 
may differ by industries.  
 Effects of institutional changes on entrepreneurial firms   4.2.2
In addition to the research on firm location determinants, a separate strand of 
research in strategy and economics investigates the effects of institutional and policy changes 
on sources of friction in entrepreneurial resource markets (Aghion, Fally, & Scarpetta, 2007; 
Kerr & Nanda, 2009b). Within this stream of research, numerous institutional reforms and 
policy initiatives have been examined, including the effects of non-compete contract 
enforcement (Marx, Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009; Samila & Sorenson, 2011), banking 
deregulation (Kerr & Nanda, 2009a, 2010), and intellectual property reforms (Cockburn & 
MacGarvie, 2009; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Png, 2011). Systematic evidence on state 
innovation programs aimed at facilitating the development of entrepreneurial resource 
markets remains lacking (Chatterji et al, 2013; Lerner, 2009). 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the past few decades have witnessed increased 
activism among state governments aiming to transform entrepreneurial talent and resources 
into high-growth companies that “stay local”, therefore diversifying the employment and tax 
base within the state. Although these public interventions are often justified by the 
theoretical arguments of mitigating market frictions, their more direct aim is to create jobs 
within state borders. To achieve this goal and to stimulate the longer-term development of 





potential. A related concern is one of “brain drain,” the loss of valuable human capital to 
other states and regions. To achieve these objectives, state initiatives use public funding in 
various ways. For example, they may provide funding directly to for-profit companies to 
help them overcome liquidity constraint and bridge the “valley of death” (Chapter 2 
provides a detailed example of such mechanism in the state of Michigan) or to research 
institutions to support research in leading technology areas and facilitate the technology 
transfer process. They may also allocate funding to establish intermediary organizations (i.e., 
catalytic enterprises, incubators), or establish a “fund of funds” program or tax credit 
program to encourage venture capital investment in the private sector.   
If state governments realize these policy objectives and improve the local 
infrastructure of resources required to form and build new science and technology 
companies (e.g., managerial training; subsidized or easier access to incubators, plants, 
investors, or other startups), they may create an environment more hospitable toward new 
science and technology companies.  In turn, the relative disadvantage of these locales relative 
to more established hubs of entrepreneurial activity could be reduced. If true, state 
innovation initiatives should increase the baseline propensities of startup companies to “stay 
local”, thus accomplishing the stated policy objectives. If, however, such programs stimulate 
entry by firms that compete in similar markets, competition over local resources and/or 
increased concerns of leakage could entice firms to move elsewhere.  
Despite the economic salience of retaining home-grown companies and related job 
positions, prior evidence on the effects of state innovation programs is largely based on 
news articles,2 case studies (Lerner, 2009), and program-specific reports (MEDC, 2010; SRI, 
                                                 






2009). Lerner (2009) suggests that the governments can provide to create a stronger business 
environment and improve the entrepreneurial ecosystem by “setting the table” and make 
entrepreneurial resources more accessible to startup companies. However, systematic 
evidence on the effects of such programs is still lacking and a number of important 
questions remain unanswered.  How likely are new science and technology companies to 
leave their home states once they have been established? Does this likelihood differ by 
different types of companies? To what extent, if at all, do state innovation programs impact 
outmigration decisions?  The answers to these questions are important from both a practical 
(policy/managerial) and scholarly perspective. This study represents a first step in providing 
more systematic evidence to answer these questions.  
4.3 Empirical Approach  
 Context and background   4.3.1
To study the impact of state innovation programs on entrepreneur relocation 
decisions, three contextual characteristics must be considered.  First, such a study requires an 
industry in which startups typically rely on external resources for product commercialization 
and company growth. It is reasonable to assume that these firms in particular are “at risk” of 
relocation during the commercialization process, in part due to the need to secure better 
access to such resources. Second, this study requires a geographic setting with less well-
developed entrepreneurial resource markets (whether for capital, management talent, or 
business services) relative to startups in other states or regions. Firms in such an 
environment would be more likely to consider the benefits of relocating vs. staying put. 
Third, this study requires a context with data available on the location decisions of firms to 





 For these reasons, this study examines the relocation of life sciences and information 
technology (IT) startups initially incorporated in a Great Lakes state between 1990 and 2009. 
As Hall and Lerner (2010) discuss, biomedical and IT startups typically require significant 
external resources from financiers and corporate partners to commercialize their products. 
However, beyond this similarity, the sectors differ in ways that are particularly useful in the 
context of this study.  First, the external resources required to commercialize a new drug or 
complex medical device tend to be an order of magnitude larger than those typically required 
for the commercialization of IT products. Unlike most IT companies, biomedical firms must 
obtain regulatory approval prior to the first sale of their products. The cost and complexity 
of that process, which averages $800 million to $1.2 billion for a new drug and $24 million to 
$94 million for complex medical devices (Adams & Brantner, 2010; DiMasi, Hansen, & 
Grabowski, 2003; Rosen, 2008), leads many biomedical startups to seek expertise and capital 
from industry incumbents during the product approval process (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; 
Pisano, 1990).  
Another difference between the two sectors relates to the existence of sector-specific 
state initiatives.  Within the Great Lakes region, several state initiatives explicitly target the 
life sciences sector. From a research design perspective, this allows me to construct target 
groups and use non-target groups as a baseline for comparison. With two industries and life 
sciences innovation programs, the information technology industry can be used as a 
comparison group.  Thus, the hypothesis is that the institutional shifts caused by these large 
public initiatives would be expected to have more pronounced effects on innovation-





In addition, the Great Lakes region3 represents an appropriate context for my sample 
as states in the region possess a strong research, innovation, and talent cultivation 
infrastructure but economically challenging conditions. Specifically, entrepreneurial ideas and 
human capital in the life sciences and information technology areas — universities, research 
institutions and incumbent firms — are widely distributed throughout the Great Lakes 
region (Austin & Affolter-Caine, 2006). Nonetheless, Samuel (2010) provides evidence from 
both statistical analysis and interviews that venture investment funds in this region are 
presently not large enough to meet later-stage financing requirements for such firms.  Austin 
and Affolter-Caine (2006) similarly assert that a lagging entrepreneurial ecosystem is a factor 
contributing to regional talent outmigration.  
The Great Lakes region also represents a useful source for study due to the active 
development of innovation programs in the region.  As described in the data section, four 
out of five states in the region launched at least one program with a budget of more than $1 
billion during the sample period. In contrast with policies aimed at attracting large firms to 
relocate to the state (i.e., “smoke-stack chasing”), these programs focus more on “economic 
gardening,” or the development of services and resources to fund and develop new 
companies, particularly those in science and technology-related sectors (Plosila, 2004).  
Overall, the region and time period for the sample provide an appropriate context in which 
to study how state initiatives impact entrepreneur relocation decisions. 
 Data and sample  4.3.2
Although research on the conditions impacting startup choices is growing rapidly, 
few datasets provide reliable time-varying information on the geographic location choices of 
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these startups. In this study, I rely on the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) 4 
dataset, which is based on Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) data that tracks firm locations as well 
as location changes. The data are constructed by taking annual snapshots of Dun and 
Bradstreet records every January since 1990. For every establishment identified, D&B 
assigns a unique “Duns” number as a means of tracking the establishment. The original data 
is recorded at the establishment level.  However, it also provides detailed annual information 
regarding the hierarchy between the focal establishment and its headquarters.  
To determine the geographic location of each firm, I use the annual six-digit zip code 
provided for each startup.  Changes in zip codes across years for a firm allow me to identify 
cross-state relocations.  The NETS data can indicate firm relocation in a number of ways.  
Most of the time, there is a forwarding address or continuing telephone number or email 
address that allows D&B to identify the new location and movement. Moreover, any 
establishment that cannot be contacted at the previous year’s address or telephone number 
will go to the “out of business or inactive” file and before any potential new establishment 
can be given a new Duns Number, it will be checked against the file to see if there is any 
indication of a movement. When D&B finds evidence that establishment has existed 
elsewhere, it retains the original Duns number but reports the new address and the year it 
changed (Neumark, Zhang, & Wall, 2007).  
I next restrict my sample to only innovation-oriented, or “high technology,” startups, 
since such firms are more likely to require significant external resources for 
commercialization and expansion relative to their less innovation-intensive counterparts. 
High technology companies are defined as those “engaged in the design, development, and 
introduction of new products and/or innovative manufacturing processes through the 
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systematic application of scientific and technology knowledge” (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1982). The Census Bureau classifies exports and imports that embody new or 
leading-edge technologies, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics assigns products in technology 
categories to four-digit NAICS industries that produce them (Heckler, 2005). Based on these 
NAICS codes, I compile a sample of high-tech life sciences and information technology 
companies that can be categorized into five industry subsectors: Biopharmaceutical, Medical 
Devices, Computers, Software, and Computer System Design.5 
To identify state innovation programs, I use the Berglund and Coburn (1995)6, the 
State Science and Technology Institute (SSTI) archives7, and the respective state government 
economic development websites to obtain innovation programs during the study period in 
the Great Lakes region. I next verify the existence of each program  by searching 
Battelle/Bio State Bioscience Initiatives reports, Google archives, and Factiva.  This step is 
designed to eliminate any programs that may have been announced but not implemented. I 
then examine descriptions, program reports, and press releases to identify the relevant 
characteristics of each program. This information includes program starting year, ending year 
(if any), and total budget commitment. Note that I collect information on all program types 
to provide a broad vantage point from which to view the evolution and range of these 
programs before narrowing my focus to those initiatives with a minimum one billion dollar 
budget.  The average size of these major state innovation programs is $1.6 billion, while the 
                                                 
5 The specific NAICS codes are as follows: (1) Biopharmaceuticals (NAICS 325411-325414); (2) Medical 
devices (NAICS 334510, 334516, 334517) (3) Computer and related products (NAICS 3341-3342, 3344-3345 
excluding 334516 and 333517); (4) Software (NAICS 5112) and (5) Computer system design (NAICS 5415). 
6 Berglund and Coburn (1995)’s compendium of state and federal cooperative technology programs describes 
and classifies state programs and provides comprehensive information about state innovation programs 
launched before 1995. Building on that seminal effort, SSTI provides a wealth of information accessible 
through the SSTI archives, a central digital repository of press releases and news reports about state programs 
(Feldman, Lanahan & Lendel, 2012).  





combined budget for the remaining within-state programs focusing on innovation or 
entrepreneurial activity is only $985 million. 
Table 4.1 lists the major state innovation programs with an initial total budget larger 
than one billion dollars launched between 1990 and 2009 in four of the focal Great Lakes 
states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Wisconsin does not have a pivotal program; 
instead, it has many programs housed in various units of the Department of Economic 
Developments.8  Any targeted sectors of the programs are also list in Table 4.1.  
During the observation period, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio each launched one major 
innovation program; Michigan launched two. Of these initiatives, The BioCrossRoads 
initiative in Indiana and Life Science Corridor program in Michigan each targeted the life 
sciences sector. In contrast, the other initiatives were non-sector-specific, emphasizing a 
broader array of sectors ranging from IT and advanced materials to alternative energy and 
the life sciences. Of the two initiatives launched in Michigan, I restrict my attention to the 
first Life Science Corridor program. Since Michigan’s second program, the 21st Century Jobs 
Fund, was formed in the immediate aftermath of the first large-scale program, I am unable 
to observe a clean pre-program trend for the 21st Century Jobs Fund.  
 Variable definitions 4.3.3
4.3.3.1 Dependent variable  
The dependent variable, Relocation, is set as equal to one when a focal firm initially 
incorporated in one of the five Great Lakes States relocates to another state and zero 
otherwise. The unit of analysis is thus a firm-state-year. A firm is at risk of relocation after it 
                                                 
8   More specifically, Wisconsin had 152 State Economic Development Programs from 2001 to 2004. As of 






is founded in a focal state. Once a startup relocates out of its home state, it is dropped from 
the analyses.  
Relocation is defined broadly to include not only the firm’s departure from the state as 
a standalone company, but also business relocation driven by mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A).  More specifically, relocation is set to 1 if either (1) a startup moves out of its home 
state or (2) a startup changes its headquarters (typically due to M&A) to another state and its 
employment count declines after the change. The latter restriction (of an employment 
decrease post-headquarter move) helps me distinguish between corporate takeovers where 
the startup and its employees are left “in tact” within the state and ones where business 
operations are redirected to the headquarter state, a more worrisome outcome for state 
policy-makers. 
Furthermore, I identify the observation period for my sample firms from 1990 to 
2010.  All of the firms in my sample are founded after 1990 (inclusive) and right censored at 
year 2010. Firm closure before 2010 is treated as a competing-risk event that prevents the 
focal firm from experiencing a relocation event. Details regarding my empirical treatment of 
the competing-risk event are discussed in the next section. Overall, my sample includes 
44,513 firms and five states over a 20-year time period (1990-2010). Of these firms, I 
observe 1,080 relocation events. Among the 1080 relocation events, 96.8 percent are 
classified as moves by standalone companies, while 3.2 percent are classified as relocations 
driven by M&A. Within the subsample of firms in the life sciences sector, 91.7 percent of 
the relocations are classified as moves by standalone companies; within the subsample of 
firms in the information technology sector, 97 percent of the relocations are classified as 
moves by standalone companies. The average relocation ages for life sciences and 





4.3.3.2 Key Independent variables  
When predicting the hazard that a given startup will leave the state, I am interested in 
the effects of the following independent variables on the startup’s relocation decision: 
Life Sciences Firm:  This variable represents a time-invariant industry sector indicator. 
This indicator takes a value of one if the focal company is from the life sciences sector and 
zero if the company is from the information technology sector. This sector-level variable 
captures any heterogeneity between life sciences and IT firms in the average resource needs 
for commercialization, and thus enables me to identify startups in sectors targeted by state 
innovation programs.   
Growing Firm: Growing firms are expected to have greater needs for external 
resources than non-growing firms. To test whether growing companies are more likely to 
relocate, I define the variable Growing Firm as a time-invariant indicator that equals one if the 
number of the focal firm’s current (or most recent) employees is more than its initial 
employment number and zero if it is the same or lower. 
Young Firm:  State innovation programs are designed to aid entrepreneurs in their 
early stage of development by providing resources to conduct applied R&D, transform 
innovations to the commercialization stage, and grow their companies.   To test whether 
state innovation programs have more pronounced effects on young companies, I define 
Young Firm as a time-invariant indicator equal to one if the focal firm is founded within three 
years before the major program launch or when the program is active in its home state, and 
zero otherwise. For example, if a program is launched in 1999, any firm incorporated after 
1996 would be considered a Young Firm.  
Program Window Indicator and Post-program Indicator. To test the impact of state 





program indicators. First, Program Window Indicator is a state-year program indicator set as 
equal to one for the three (five) years following a major program launch and equal to zero 
for the three (five) years preceding the program launch. Program Window Indicator therefore 
provides a 6 (10) -year program event window within which to compare the hazard rates of 
relocation before and after a program launch. As an alternative measure, Post-program Indicator, 
measured at the state-year level, is set as equal to one for the time period after the program 
launch and equal to zero for the time period before the program launch. Post-program 
Indicator therefore provides a longer pre- and post-program estimation period for firms at 
the state level.  
4.3.3.3 Control variables 
A number of additional factors at the firm, industry, or macroeconomic level could 
influence the hazard rate of an entrepreneur firm moving to another state.   
At the firm level, I control for the size of the focal company. Size is measured as the 
number of employees in a specific year, and thus is a time-variant variable.  
At the industry and macroeconomic level, I construct the Herfindahk-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), industry growth rate and state real GDP growth rate for each state. Specifically, 
I measure the Local market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). To do 
so, I first aggregate the establishment-level data from the NETS dataset to the industry 
subsector level for each state and then calculate the time-variant HHI. I compute the local 
industry subsector growth rate for each state as the percentage change of total sales by industry 
subsector for each state over time. At the macroeconomic level, I also compute the state real 
GDP growth as a control variable.  The state GDP growth rate is calculated as the percentage 
of real state GDP, using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Note that all 





 Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics for the firms in my sample. All covariates 
pass the variance inflation factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity. The mean value of the 
Growing Firm indicator shows that only 23 percent of the firms have more employees than 
their initial number when founded. The average number of employees of sample companies 
is 6.5.  These statistics suggest that the firms constitute an appropriate sample range of 
entrepreneurial firms. 
 Estimation approach  4.3.4
To obtain baseline statistics on the extent of relocation for the firms in my sample, I 
first track the relocation patterns of a cohort of companies established at the beginning of 
the observation period (1990-1994) and investigate whether the relocation likelihood differs 
by the type of company within the sample. I then use a competing-risks regression model to 
examine the relocation hazard across different types of companies.  
 The selection of a hazard model to estimate the effects of covariates on the hazard 
rates of specific events has been utilized in previous studies (e.g., Shane, 2002). In these 
studies, a Cox proportional hazard model is often used since it does not require a parametric 
function form for the baseline hazard (Allison, 1984; Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 2008). In 
the context of this study, however, a firm may experience a competing event (closure) before 
it experiences relocation.  If these events are not independent, treating the firm that 
experienced the competing event as censored can bias the estimation. Thus, my hazard 
model must count firms that experience the competing risk as having no chance to 
experience the alternative event. To fulfill this requirement, I use the competing risks model 
proposed by Fine and Gray (1999). This model enables me to assess the effect of covariates 






The competing risks model uses semiparametric methods to model the covariate 
effects on the cumulative incidence function (CIF). The cumulative incidence function (CIF) 
measures the probability that the event of interest occurs before a given time.  In order to 
define the CIF, I first define the subhazard function for the event of interest as follows:  
ℎ�(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚∆𝑡→0
𝑃{𝑡≤𝑇<𝑡+∆𝑡,𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 | 𝑇>𝑡 𝑜𝑟 (𝑇≤𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)}
∆𝑡
      (1)        
Note that CIF(t) is a function of the subhazard only for the event of interest, so if a 
regression model is defined for ℎ�(𝑡), it can be used to interpret the covariate effects on 
CIF(t).  This leads to the following representation: 
𝐶𝐼𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 �−∫ ℎ�(𝑢)𝑑𝑢𝑡0 �                             (2) 
The Fine and Gray (1999) model is a direct analog to a Cox regression where the 
subhazard function takes a traditional semiparametric function form. In the context of this 
study, the subhazard function estimates the hazard of firm i relocating out of state j in year t 
using the following functional form9:  
ℎ�𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = ℎ�0(t)exp [𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑌𝑗𝑡]                                        (3) 
where ℎ�𝑖𝑗(𝑡) is the hazard rate that firm i relocates out of state j in year t conditional on 
having not done so by year t, while treating firm closure as a competing-risk event.  
Furthermore, ℎ�𝑖𝑗(𝑡) represents an arbitrary baseline hazard function. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of firm 
characteristics and 𝑌𝑗𝑡  is a vector of state characteristics including industry-level and 
macroeconomic-level controls. Robust standard errors, clustered by startup, allow for intra-
firm nonindependence of observations. 
                                                 
9 For simplicity, I use the term “hazard of relocation” instead of “subhazard of relocation” to refer to the 





 As shown in model (4), I add a time-invariant life science industry indicator to estimate 
the difference of relocation patterns between life sciences companies and information 
technology companies.  I also include the Growing Firm indicator to the baseline model (1) to 
estimate difference in relocation hazard rates between growing companies and non-growing 
companies.  
ℎ�𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = ℎ�0(t)exp [𝛼𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑌𝑗𝑡]           (4)  
 To estimate the major innovation program effect on relocation, I use two different 
approaches. First, I use the Program Window Indicator to construct a 6-year (10-year) program 
event window for Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio with billion dollar programs and 
compare the relocation hazard rates three (five) years before and three (five) years after the 
program launch. For Indiana and Michigan, since their focal programs target the life sciences 
industry, the sample includes only life sciences companies for these two states. For Illinois 
and Ohio, since their programs target both life sciences and information technology sectors, 
the sample includes both industries for these two states. Equation (5) presents the estimation 
model.   
ℎ�𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = ℎ�0(t)exp [𝛼𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚_1𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑌𝑗𝑡]           (5)  
 Second, for the two states that launched life sciences-oriented programs (Indiana 
BroCrossRoads and Michigan Life Science Corridor), I apply a difference-in-differences 
analytical framework. As shown in model (6), the main coefficient of interest is 𝛼, which 
indicates the program impact on life science companies compared to information technology 
companies.  
ℎ�𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = ℎ�0(t)exp [𝛼𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚_2𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚_2𝑗𝑡 + 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 +





4.4 Empirical Evidence  
Given the current lack of research on the location choices of entrepreneurs, a 
number of intriguing questions arise.  First, it would be useful to know how likely new 
science and technology companies are to leave their home states. A related question is 
whether this likelihood is different depending on the sector.  Finally, the main question of 
interest in this study is how the presence of a state innovation program affects the relocation 
likelihood.  To shed empirical light on these questions, I first conduct a non-parametric 
analysis without controls by examining the proportion of companies founded in an early 
cohort that relocated out of their home states by 2010. Note that the statistics are 
conditional on firm survival until the end of our observation period. After establishing the 
base likelihood of relocation, I use a more rigorous competing-risks regression model to 
investigate whether life sciences and information technology firms have different likelihoods 
of relocation and whether state innovation programs impact a firm’s relocation likelihood.  
 Relocation patterns: different types of companies  4.4.1
Figure 4.1 presents the proportion of firms established between 1990 and 1994 that 
chose to relocate by 2010.  Conditional on survival until 2010, I find that 4.6 percent of 
companies in the sample moved out of their home states. Not surprisingly, this percentage is 
higher for growing firms, which may have greater incentives to search for additional external 
resources in a new location. Indeed, the results show that 5.9 percent of high-growth firms 
in the sample relocated by 2010. Furthermore, since life sciences companies have higher 
requirements for external resources for commercialization and company growth than do IT 
companies, a higher proportion of life science companies should relocate. After dividing the 
sample into life sciences and IT industries, I find that 11.8 percent of growing life sciences 





In the above analysis, closure and relocation are treated as independent events. 
However, to estimate the probability of relocation before a certain time, it is more precise to 
take into account that firm closure may also occur and to treat this possibility as a competing 
risk. When competing risks exist, the cumulative incidence function is used instead of the 
normal survival function. 
To empirically tests the covariate effects on the hazard rates of entrepreneurial-firm 
relocation, I use the semiparametric method of modeling covariate effects on the cumulative 
incidence function as described in the previous section.  Using the full sample of companies, 
Figure 4.3 plots the overall cumulative incidence for the event of relocation while treating 
closure as a competing risk. The overall hazard rate for relocation accumulates to around 3.2 
percent by the end of the analysis time period.  
Table 4.3 presents the results from the competing risks analysis. Column (1) shows 
the baseline results for the difference in relocation probability between the life sciences and 
information technology samples. Column (2) presents the results adding founding year fixed 
effects to allow for firms founded in different calendar years to face different hazards. The 
results in Columns (1) and (2) show that, after controlling for time-variant firm-level, 
industry-level and macroeconomic-level covariates, life sciences companies have a 
significantly higher rate of relocation than IT companies. More specifically, over the analysis 
time period, life science companies face a 135 percent (=exp(0.854)-1) to 160 percent 
(=exp(0.957)-1) higher hazard rate of relocation. This result is depicted graphically in Figure 
4.4, which plots the predicated cumulative incidence of relocation for life sciences and 
information technology companies.  
Similarly, the results in Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.3 show the comparative 





expected to have higher incentives to move due to their greater need for external resources.  
The result provided in Column (3) is consistent with this prediction. More specifically, the 
estimates suggest that growing companies face a 98.2 percent (=(exp(0.638)-1) to 99.1 
percent (=exp(0.689)-1) higher hazard rate of relocation than do non-growing companies. 
Figure 4.5 graphically depicts the predicted cumulative incidence of relocation for growing 
versus non-growing firms. These results suggest that companies with more employees in the 
current year than their initial year have significantly higher relocation rates than companies 
with the same or fewer current employees. 
Examining the results for the control variables, I find that the coefficients for firm 
size are consistently significant at the 1% level, indicating that larger firms are more likely to 
move out of their home state. In addition, I find that higher local market concentration is 
significantly associated with a lower likelihood of departure. That is, firms prefer to stay 
when their local market shows relatively higher concentration. Moreover, the results show 
that both higher local industry subsector growth and higher economic growth may lower the 
likelihood of firm relocation. This result is not surprising; favorable industry and economic 
conditions provide incentives for a firm to remain.  
 Overall, the evidence suggests that life sciences startups are more likely to relocate 
than are new information technology companies, and that growing companies are more 
likely to relocate than are non-growing companies. I interpret this evidence as consistent 
with the view that firms that require more external resources (financial/human capital, 
services) during the commercialization process are disproportionately more likely to leave 





 Impact of state innovation programs  4.4.2
In this section, I outline the two empirical approaches I use to test whether state 
innovation programs in the focal Great Lakes states reduce relocation likelihood.  In the first 
approach (as shown in Equation (5)), I create two event windows — a 6-year short event 
window and a 10-year long event window — around the major program launch time. After 
controlling for other time-variant firm-level, industry-level and macroeconomic-level 
covariates, I can then investigate whether the relocation hazard rate changes after program 
launch.  
The results based on this first approach are presented in Table 4.4. Column (1) of 
Table 4.4 shows that after the program launch, firms have a lower hazard rate of relocation.  
The effect is not, however, statistically significant at the conventional statistical level. 
Column (2) suggests that evidence that the program has a significant impact on firms 
established within three years before the program launch or when the program is active. On 
average, the point estimate shows a 2.4 percent (=1-exp(0.444-0.468)) lower hazard rate of 
relocation for young firms after the program launch. Interestingly, after I add an interaction 
term between program indicator and growing firm indicator, the results in Column (2) shows 
that the program effects do not differ by growing vs. non-growing firms.  
Panel B of Table 4.4 presents the results using a10-year event window. The overall 
results are consistent with those in Panel A.  However, both the magnitude and significance 
of the program effects on firm relocation are larger. These results suggest that the program 
effects are more pronounced over a longer time period.    
In the second approach, shown in Equation (6), I restrict my attention to those 
programs targeting firms in the life science industry.  Specifically, I analyze the effects of the 





within the respective states. The difference-in-differences framework tests the extent to 
which the rate of relocation hazard for life sciences companies changes more dramatically 
than that of information technology companies. The intuition behind this analysis is that if 
life sciences-oriented programs are effective in retaining high technology firms, then the 
relocation hazard rate should decrease more dramatically in the life sciences versus 
information technology sector. Table 4.5 presents the results from this second approach. In 
all three model specifications, the coefficients of the interaction terms are negative and 
consistently significant. Including industry and macroeconomic control variables yields 
similar results.  
Overall, my findings suggest that the probability that new science and technology 
companies from the Great Lakes states will relocate decreases following the launch of a 
major state innovation program.  Furthermore, I find that this effect is more pronounced for 
young firms and for firms targeted by such a program.  
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study has explored the question of whether entrepreneurship is a local 
phenomenon, or whether commercialization and expansion requirements require firms to 
relocate as they grow.  In an effort to “set a better table” for new innovation-oriented 
companies, many state governments, joint with other organizations, have poured billions of 
public monies toward infrastructure development and support  to encourage entrepreneurs 
(Lerner, 2009). Given the magnitude of this financial commitment, there are valid reasons to 
be skeptical about the extent to which such policy initiatives shape firm decisions and thus a 





One key firm decision with a direct impact on the goals of building a vibrant 
entrepreneurial hub is the decision whether to remain in the state when reaching the 
commercialization stage.  Despite the implications of this decision for both policymakers 
and innovation scholars, empirical evidence on the baseline proclivity of such firms to “stay 
home” or move away remains limited.  Likewise, the question of whether state innovation 
programs can impact this decision has been untested, perhaps due to the difficulty of 
tracking the geographic movement of entrepreneurial firms over time or a lack of centralized 
information about innovation programs administered at the state level. 
To address this gap in the research, this study contributes new evidence based on a 
sample of life sciences and IT startups established in the Great Lakes region between 1990 
and 2010. Based on both nonparametric and semiparametric analyses, I find compelling 
evidence that high technology companies in the life sciences sector are more likely to 
relocate out their home states compared to those in the information technology sector 
during the same observation period. Among startups, growing firms are disproportionately 
more likely to leave their originating state. These findings are consistent with the view that 
“leaving home” is in part driven by the need to secure access to external resources required 
for commercialization and expansion.  
I also find that this proclivity of science and technology startups to relocate to other 
states declines significantly in the wake of major program launches by state governments in 
the Great Lakes region, particularly for young firms and for those firms in sectors directly 
targeted by the program.  
In combination, these findings suggest that high technology companies initially 
located in a region with a good innovation infrastructure but a relatively weak entrepreneurial 





corresponds to a well-developed entrepreneurial resource market. If the entrepreneurial 
resource market is perfect, capital, talent and other related services can be allocated 
effectively to startup companies at the right place and right time (Arrow, 1962; Nelson & 
Romer, 1996; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Consequently, the findings in this study imply 
the existence of market frictions for entrepreneurial resources. They also suggest that one 
reason entrepreneurial firms may strategically decide to relocate is to overcome the market 
frictions. Indeed, even after controlling for local market and industry sector conditions, the 
empirical evidence shows that firms with higher requirements for external resources for 
commercialization and expansion are still more likely to relocate.  
Interestingly, state innovation programs are often justified by market friction 
arguments. If such programs can improve the local entrepreneurial ecosystem, then there 
should be a lower hazard of relocation. The empirical results support this prediction. The 
results also show that these programs do not have a strong impact in retaining growing firms, 
which suggests that the firms that remain are those with less promising growth expectations.  
From a public policy perspective, this selection process may have a long-term consequence 
that contradicts the main objective of these public initiatives.   
While a first step towards understanding the impact of state innovation programs on 
firm relocation decisions, this study has several limitations that build a natural stage for 
further research.  First, this study focuses on the home state without considering the state of 
relocation destination.  By investigating where these firms move, we can get a more 
complete picture of the reasons for firm outmigration. Second, this study does not fully 
explore the performance of companies that are more likely to relocate. Due to potential self-
selection problems, a more refined study design needs to be conducted in order to 





to what extent, if at all, state innovation initiatives affect their relocation propensity (Acs, 
2011; Acs & Mueller, 2008; Stangler, 2010). Third, this study treats a major program launch 
as a regime shift and implicitly assumes that programs are randomly distributed across states.  
Future research could explore the effects of different program components by probing more 
deeply into the specific design of each program to explore any potential bias caused by the 
non-randomness of a program launch.  
In conclusion, this study provides the first systematic evidence that policy 
interventions at the state level can significantly alter geographic movement among 
entrepreneurial firms. It thus sheds light on our understanding of the dynamics of location 
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Figure 4.1 Proportion of Firms Formed in 1990-94 and Relocated Out of the Home 
State by 2010 
 
Note: Based on 2555 life sciences and IT startups initially incorporated in IL, IN, MI, OH, and WI still active 
as if 2010  
 
                 
Figure 4.2 Proportion of Firms Formed in 1990-94 and Relocated Out of the Home 
State by 2010 (Life Sciences vs. Information Technology) 
 
Note: Based on 2555 life sciences and IT startups initially incorporated in IL, IN, MI, OH, and WI still active 






Figure 4.3 Cumulative Incidence of Relocation (Full Sample) 
 
              
 Figure 4.4 Cumulative Incidence of Relocation    






Figure 4.5 Cumulative Incidence of Relocation  







Table 4.1 Major State Innovation Programs, 1990-2009 




Major Target Technology 
Areas 
Illinois IL VentureTECH 2000 2005 1900 Life Sciences, Information Technology, Advanced Physics 
Indiana 
BioCrossRoads                                            
(Central Indiana Life Sciences 
Initiative) 
2002 ongoing 1500 Life Sciences 
Michigan 
Michigan Life Science Corridor                
(Michigan Technology Tri-
corridor after 2004) 
1999 2005 1000 
Life Sciences (extended to 
Advanced Manufacturing, 
Homeland Security after 2004) 
The 21st Century Job Fund 2006 ongoing 2000 
Life Sciences, Advanced 
Manufacturing, Homeland 
Security, Defense, Alternative 
Energy 







Table 4.2 Summary Statistics 
  Variables Obs. Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Growing firm  292936 0.23 0.42 1 
        (2) Life Sciences firm 292936 0.03 0.16 0.017 1 
       (3) Young firm indicator 292936 0.45 0.50 -0.118 0.007 1 
      (4) Employment (10s) 292936 0.65 4.14 0.078 0.044 -0.026 1 
     (5) Local market concentration (%) 292936 2.33 3.89 0.006 0.720 -0.037 0.038 1 
    (6) Local industry subsector growth (%) 292936 4.81 11.01 0.003 -0.028 -0.241 -0.004 0.038 1 
   (7) State real GDP growth (%) 292936 1.78 2.43 0.017 -0.026 -0.297 0.000 0.017 0.316 1 
  (8) Program window indicator (10-year) 168631 0.55 0.50 -0.021 0.046 0.457 -0.003 -0.113 -0.509 -0.519 1 
 (9) Program window indicator (6-year) 66243 0.53 0.50 -0.010 0.016 0.181 -0.010 -0.101 -0.696 -0.288 0.870 1 






Table 4.3  Competing Risks Regressions: Comparison of Different Types of Firms   
                  (Event of Interest = Relocation) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Key Independent Variables  




   Growing firm  
  
0.689*** 0.638*** 
   
(0.067) (0.069) 
Control Variables  
      Firm size (# of employees in 10s)  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Local market concentration (%)  -0.048*** -0.053*** -0.029** -0.033** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
  Local industry subsector growth (%)  -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  State real GDP growth (%) -0.092*** -0.136*** -0.093*** -0.131*** 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry subsector dummies No  No  Yes Yes 
Founding year dummies  No  Yes No Yes 
# of Observations 292,936 292,936 292,936 292,936 
# of Firms  44513 44513 44513 44513 
Log-Likelihood -11186 -11154 -11133 -11109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Note:  All regressions are estimated using competing-risks model with time-variant covariates.  





Table 4.4 The Impact of State Innovation Programs on Relocation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A: 6-Year Program Event Window  
 
Panel B: 10-year Program Event Window 
Key Independent Variables  
         Program window indicator  -0.044 0.444* -0.140 
 
-0.132 0.649*** -0.186 
 
(0.182) (0.250) (0.194) 
 
(0.161) (0.225) (0.176) 
 Program window indicator * Young firm 
 
-0.468* 





   
(0.223) 
  Program window indicator * Growing firm 
  
0.403 
   
0.252 
   
(0.250) 
   
(0.211) 
 Young firm 
 
-0.623*** 





   
(0.158) 
  Growing firm  
  
0.295 
   
0.590*** 
   
(0.199) 
   
(0.169) 
Control Variables  
         Firm size (# of employees in 10s)  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Local market concentration (%)  -0.060 -0.058 -0.062 
 
-0.063 -0.070 -0.064 
 
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046) 
 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.040) 
 Local industry subsector growth  (%)  -0.016** -0.016** -0.015** 
 
-0.021*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 State real GDP growth (%) -0.100*** -0.131*** -0.102*** 
 
-0.119*** -0.149*** -0.123*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry subsector dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
# of Observations 66,243 66,243 66,243 
 
107,344 107,344 107,344 
# of Firms  16849 16849 16849 
 
20515 20515 20515 
Log-likelihood -3031 -3017 -3020   -4301 -4279 -4276 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:  
1. Program window indicator is a time-variant variable equal to one for the three (five) years after the program launch and equal to zero for the three (five) years before 
the program launch 







Table 4.5 Difference-in-differences Estimates of State Innovation Program Effects on Relocation (Life Sciences Programs only) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Key Independent Variables 
     Post-program indicator * Life Sciences firm -1.296** -1.093* -1.076* 
 
(0.605) (0.621) (0.619) 
  Post-program indicator 0.979*** 0.984*** 0.778*** 
 
(0.122) (0.122) (0.172) 
  Life Sciences firm 1.054** 0.848* 1.450** 
 
(0.464) (0.484) (0.648) 
Control Variables 





  Local market concentration (%)  
  
-0.027 
   
(0.017) 
  Local industry subsector growth (%)  
  
-0.011 
   
(0.007) 
  State real GDP growth (%) 
  
-0.037 
   
(0.023) 
State dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
# of Observations 95,896 95,896 95,896 
# of Firms  14928 14928 14928 
Log-Likelihood -3293 -3289 -3284 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Notes:  
  1. Post-program indicator is a time-variant variable equal to one for the years after the program launch and equal to zero for the years before the program launch. 





CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
My dissertation provides new evidence regarding the effects of state innovation 
programs on the performance and behavior of entrepreneurial science and technology 
companies in the Great Lakes region. Specifically, I assemble novel databases and use 
multiple research methods to address the effects in three essays.  
The first essay examines the extent to which, if at all, competitive R&D awards from 
Michigan innovation programs enhance the performance of participating ventures relative to 
startups that seek but fail to receive an award. The results show strong and compelling 
evidence that state R&D awards enhance the commercial viability (i.e., survival) of recipient 
firms, suggesting a relaxation of financial constraints. I also find that receipt of state R&D 
funding enhances the follow-on financing for these new ventures, but only for those with 
more onerous information challenges in entrepreneurial capital markets. 
My second essay broadens the scope to other states in the Great Lakes region and 
investigates whether state innovation programs alter the entrepreneurial founding 
environment and, in turn, shape the post-entry survival of new ventures. Based on state 
initiatives launched in the Great Lakes region from 1990 to 2009 and evidence from the life 
sciences industry, I find that new ventures formed when an innovation program is present 
have significantly higher survival rates than new ventures formed without the presence of 
such a program. I also find that program effects on firm survival diminish over time and that 




commercialization. This study provides new evidence on the heterogeneous effects of state 
policy initiatives on entrepreneurial activity.  
In the third essay, I examine the baseline proclivity of science and technology 
startups to leave their state of initial incorporation and the effects, if any, of state innovation 
programs on such outmigration in the life sciences and information technology industries. 
Based on evidence from the Great Lakes states during 1990 to 2010, I find that firms with 
greater resource requirements for commercialization are more likely to leave their home 
states. The evidence in this essay also shows that, for young firms, the relocation hazard is 
significantly lower following the launch of a large innovation program by the home state. 
Moreover, in states that have launched innovation programs with specific industry targets, 
firms within the targeted sector are less likely to leave the state as they grow.  Overall, this 
study provides the first systematic evidence that policy interventions at the state level can 
significantly alter the geographic movement among entrepreneurial firms.    
My dissertation opens rich venues for future research and points to several directions 
for this research. First, future research could probe more deeply into the mechanisms of 
these public initiatives. For example, it would be interesting to investigate the different 
performance implications of the use of public funding to directly subsidize new ventures or 
to indirectly fund entrepreneurial firms through private sectors. In both my second and third 
essays, I treat major programs across states as homogeneous. Disentangling and comparing 
the effects of different program components would be interesting and could provide a more 
precise understanding of what drives the state innovation program effect on entrepreneurial 
firms.  
A second area of interest for future research is the extent to which the results from 




the Great Lakes region in the United States, future research could expand the scope to 
include other states or countries, ideally using insights from my dissertation research to 
inform comparative assessments of public efforts aimed at stimulating entrepreneurial 
activity. In particular, Asian countries such as China and Singapore could be interesting 
contexts to explore, as these countries have central and local governments that have 
launched large-scale initiatives with the aim to mitigate imperfections in resource markets for 
entrepreneurial firms. 
In sum, my dissertation provides new insight into the role of state innovation 
programs on entrepreneur firms; it also provides intriguing possibilities for future research.  
Such future research could have important implications for academics as well as 
entrepreneurs, investors, and policymakers in understanding the relation between public 
innovation initiatives and the performance and behavior of firms they are designed to 
support. 
 
 
 
 
 
